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Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids employment discrimi-
nation against any individual "because of such individual's sex."' This
prohibition of sex discrimmation was hurriedly added to Title VII not long
before its passage; as a result, little legislative history exists to aid courts in
its interpretation.2 Perhaps for this reason, the prohibition has been a
judicial battleground, in which some expansive readings of its language
eventually have found favor,3 whereas others have failed to command
support.4 Today, Title VII recovery for sexual favoritism is one such
battleground.5
* Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University B.A., Johns
Hopkins University, 1968; J.D., Columbia Umversity, 1973; LL.M., George Washington
University, 1975; S.J.D., George Washington University, 1981.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); see id. § 2000e-2(b)-(d) (containing similar
language).
2. See Mentor Say Bank v Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986); see also infra notes
80-90 and accompanying text (discussing relevant legislative history).
3. One example of an expansive reading of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion is the law of sexual harassment discussed infra at notes 15-43 and accompanying text.
4. For an example of a narrower reading of Title VII, see MACK A. PLAYER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.25(c)(2) (1988) (noting that Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination has been held not to include discrimination on bases of homosexuality and
transsexuality).
5. See Mundy v Palmetto Ford, Inc., No. 92-1041, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19588,
at *5 (4th Cir. July 27, 1993) (holding that for Title VII purposes, "sex" does not include
voluntary romance); Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588,590 (9th Cir.
1992) (recognizing possibility of sexual favoritism recovery and of work environment sexual
harassment claim based in part on sexual favoritism, but denying recovery on facts);
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 861-63 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing
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possibility of work environment sexual harassment recovery based in part on sexual
favoritism, but denying recovery on facts); DeCintio v Westchester County Medical Ctr.,
807 F.2d 304, 306-08 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that sexual favoritism based on consensual
sexual relationship does not constitute sex discrimination), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987);
King v Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (recognizing possible recovery for
sexual favoritism, but reversing and remanding trial court decision that recognized favoritism
claim but denied liability on facts); Dirksen v City of Springfield, 842 F Supp. 1117, 1121-
22 (C.D. II1. 1994) (holding that sexual favoritism, although not actionable as such, may help
establish that advancement generally hinged on granting sexual favors, which supports quid
pro quo harassment claim); Piech v Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F Supp. 825, 828-30
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying sexual favoritism claim and holding that sexual favoritism can help
establish quid pro quo sexual harassment claim); Ayers v AT&T, 826 F Supp. 443, 445
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that sexual favoritism does not constitute sex discrimination);
Parrish v English Am. Tailoring Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 567, 569 (D. Md.
1988) (noting that Title VH does not prohibit discrimination based upon sexual affiliations);
Broderick v Ruder, 685 F Supp. 1269, 1278 (D.D.C. 1988) (granting recovery for work
environment sexual harassment based almost wholly on sexual favoritism); Miller v
Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F Supp. 495, 501-02 (W.D. Pa.) (holding that sexual favoritism
based on consensual sexual relationship does not constitute sex discrimination and noting that
sexual favoritism may contribute to work environment sexual harassment claim, but denying
harassment claim on facts), aff'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Priest v Rotary, 634
F Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding violation of Title VII when employer prefers
female employees who submit to his sexual advances); Toscano v Nimmo, 570 F Supp.
1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that proof of sexual favoritism helps plaintiff establish
that granting sexual favors is necessary for advancement, which constitutes quid pro quo
sexual harassment that violates Title VII); see also Herman v Western Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d
696, 701-03 (Kan. 1994) (finding sexual favoritism and other sex-related employer behavior
insufficient for work environment sexual harassment liability under Title VII); Polk v
Pollard, 539 So. 2d 675, 677-78 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that sexual favoritism does not
constitute sex discrimination under state statute resembling Title VII); Hickman v W-S
Equip. Co., 438 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Erickson v Marsh &
McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 802-03 (N.J. 1990) (holding that at least when sexual
relationship is consensual, resulting sexual favoritism does not violate state statute resembling
Title VII); Nicolo v Citibank N.Y State, 554 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798-99 (Sup. Ct. 1990)
(holding that isolated act of sexual favoritism favoring only one employee is not actionable
under state statute resembling Title VII, but that sexual favoritism may contribute to quid pro
quo and work environment sexual harassment claims on appropriate facts); Kersul v Skulls
Angels Inc., 495 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (denying motion to dismiss sexual
favoritism claim under state statute resembling Title VII); Kryeski v Schott Glass
Technologies, Inc., 626 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that sexual favoritism
resulting from consensual relationship does not constitute sex discrimination under state
statute resembling Title VII), appeal denied, 639 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1994).
For a discussion of quid pro quo and work environment sexual harassment, see infra
notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
SEXUAL FAVORITISM
In the typical sexual favoritism (or "paramour") claim,6 the plaintiff
alleges that her employer has violated Title VII by favoring another
employee (the paramour) due to a sexual or romantic relationship between
a supervisor and the paramour. Perhaps the most common case involves
a male supervisor who assertedly favors a female subordinate over another
female subordinate.7 Sometimes, however, the injured party is male.8 In
most, if not all, of the relevant cases, the sexual or romantic relationship
between supervisor and paramour appears to have been consensual. Few,
if any, assert that the relationship was coerced by the supervisor's sexual
harassment of the subordinate.9 At the other end of the spectrum, few
cases appear to involve paramours willing to trade sex for personal
advancement. 10
A majority of the courts that have considered Title VII sexual
favoritism claims have recogmzed the possibility of recovery for sexual
favoritism under one theory or another.II The relatively sparse scholarly
6. See EEOC. Policy Guide on EmployerLiabilityfor Sexual Favoritism Under Title
VI, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:6817,405:6817 (Jan. 12, 1990) [hereinafter EEOCPolicy
Guide] (usingterms "sexual favoritism" and "paramour"). The sexual favoritism claim also
has been called a "reverse quid pro quo" sexual harassment claim. See Piech v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 841 F Supp. 825, 828 (N.D. I11. 1994).
7 See King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Because no sexual
favoritism case as yet has involved a female supervisor or a male paramour, this Article
invariably describes the supervisor as a man and the favored party/paramour as a woman.
8. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); see also Mundy v. Palmetto Ford, Inc., No. 92-
1041, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19588, at *5 (4th Cir. July 27, 1993) (rejecting retaliatory
discharge claim involving male employee who complained of sexual favoritism).
9. In fact, I have been unable to identify any sexual favoritism case in which a
coerced sexual relationship was clearly present. Priest v. Rotary, 634 F Supp. 571 (N.D.
Cal. 1986), is the best candidate, but the defendant in Priest, although liable to the plaintiff
for sexual harassment and sexual favoritism, apparently had a consensual sexual
relationship with the paramour. Id. at 576.
10. In King v Palmer, 598 F Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), there was deposition testimony that the paramour "was intimate with [the
supervisor] and was prepared to have sex with him if necessary to get the promotion." Id.
at 67 The testimony, however, came from the paramour's "former close boy friend." Id.
11. See supra note 5 (noting cases that involve sexual favoritism claims).
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work on sexual favoritism also tends to favor such claims.' 2 This Article,
however, departs from the scholarly consensus on sexual favoritism. After
the next Part describes Title VII sexual harassment law and Title VII sexual
favoritism litigation, the Article concludes that Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination in employment does not include sexual favoritism as such.'3
Then, the Article examines three ways in which victims of sexual favoritism
might seek relief through Title VII sexual harassment law and concludes that
that body of law occasionally may be useful to them.'4
H. Preliminary Matters
Sexual harassment law and sexual favoritism law interact in ways that
are described at various points in this Article. In addition, certain common
themes pervade both bodies of law For these reasons, the Article opens by
briefly describing the law of sexual harassment under Title VII. Then, it
surveys the extant case law on Title VII sexual favoritism claims.
12. See PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.25(d)(2), at 251 (concluding that sexual favoritism
should be actionable discrimination); Joan E. Van Tol, Eros GoneAwry:Ltability Under Title
WI for Workplace Sexual Favoritism, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 177 (1991) (arguing that
sexual favoritism should be recognized as distinct form of sexual harassment under Title VII);
Mary C. Manemann, Comment, The Meaning of "Sex" in Title VI. Is Favoring an Employee
Lover a Violation of the Act?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV 612, 663-64 (1989) (favoring recognition
of Title VII cause of action for sexual favoritism); cf. 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41A.36 (1993) (describing law on sexual favoritism and
apparently not objecting to it); Robert A. Shearer, Paramour Claims Under Title WI: Liability
for Co-Worker/Employer Sexual Relationships, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 57, 58-65 (1989)
(same). See generally Colleen R. Courtade, Annotation, Nature and Burden of Proofin Title
VII Action Alleging Favoritism in Promotion or Job Assignment Due to Sexual or Romantic
Relationship Between Supervisor and Another, 86 A.L.R. FED. 230 (1988).
13. By sexual favoritism "as such," I mean sexual favoritism that is not factually linked
to sexual harassment and is not part of a sexual harassment claim.
14. The three arguments are that: (1) victims of sexual favoritism have standing to sue
on behalf of favored parties who submitted to quid pro quo sexual harassment; (2) sexual
favoritism occasionally can help establish an implied quid pro quo sexual harassment claim;
and (3) sexual favoritism may constitute, or help establish, work environment sexual
harassment. On the distinction between quid pro quo and work environment sexual
harassment, see infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
SEXUAL FAVORITISM
A. Sexual Harassment Under Title WI
Coincident with increased popular attention to the subject,"5 Title VII
sexual harassment claims began to appear during the late 1970s. 6 At first,
some courts rejected these claims. Among their reasons was the belief that
sexual harassment, while no doubt morally objectionable, is not sex
discrimination. According to one district court, for example:
The substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was discriminated
against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to
engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor. Regardless of how
inexcusable the conduct of plaintiffs supervisor might have been, it
does not evidence an arbitrary bamer to continued employment based
on plaintiff's sex.' 7
One might argue that if a woman suffers a job-related disadvantage because
she refused to have sexual relations with a male supervisor, that disadvan-
tage surely had something to do with her gender. The reply is that while this
may be true in a particular case, both sexual harassment's perpetrators and
its victims can be of either gender. As the district court asserted in Tomlans
v Public Service Electnc & Gas Co.:'
8
In this instance the supervisor was male and the employee was female.
But no immutable principle of psychology compels this alignment of
parties. The gender lines might as easily have been reversed, or even
not crossed at all. While sexual desire animated the parties, or at least
one of them, the gender of each is incidental to the claim of abuse.' 9
In other words, sexual harassment is not sex discrimination because gender,
while important to any particular harasser, is not the essence of the asserted
wrong.
This argument against Title VII sexual harassment liability did not
endure for long. Indeed, it was rejected by the courts of appeals in the two
15. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 41A.21, at 8-155 to -156.
16. See id. at 8-155 to -158 (describing early Title VII sexual harassment litigation);
Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms ofAsking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of
Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHi. L. REv 328, 329-37 (1988) (same).
17 Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
18. 422 F Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
19 Tomkins v Public Serv Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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cases quoted above.' Title VII's basic liability provision, section 703(a),
forbids employment decisions made "because of" the victim's sex.2'
Whatever its meaning,' this language almost certainly does not require that
the challenged decision be wholly motivated by gender.3 Thus, it is not
irrational to say that sexual harassment occurs "because of" the victim's
gender. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit stated the issue:
[A]ppellee has argued that "[the plaintiff] was allegedly denied
employment enhancement not because she was a woman, but rather
because she decided not to furnish the sexual consideration claimed to
have been demanded." We cannot accept this analysis of the situation
But for [the plaintiff's] womanhood, her participation in
sexual activity would never have been solicited. To say, then, that she
was victimized in her employment simply because she declined the
invitation is to ignore the asserted fact that she was invited only
because she was a woman subordinate to the inviter in the hierarchy
of agency personnel.24
"It is no answer," the court added, "to say that a similar condition could be
imposed on a male subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon
a subordinate of either gender by a homosexual superior of the same
gender. "I In each case, the employee would be confronted with employer
behavior that the employee would not have faced but for his or her gender.26
20. Tomkins v Public Serv Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1977);
Barnes v Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990-92 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
22. For a discussion of some competing Title VII causation requirements, see infra
notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
23. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990-91 (observing that House of Representatives rejected
amendment in 1964 that would have added "solely" to "because" in § 703(a), presumably on
ground that Congress feared debilitating effect of amendment on Title VII's prohibitions);
Willingham v Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); see
also 110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964).
24. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted) (quoting from defendant's brief).
25. Id. at 990 n.55.
26. Id. Some courts have agreed that Title VII forbids a supervisor's sexual harassment
of a subordinate of the same gender. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 41A.35(b).
For an argument that this rule is not inconsistent with Title VII's failure to ban discrimination
on the basis of homosexuality, see id. at 8-183. In addition, Title VII almost certainly forbids
SEXUAL FAVORITISM
Arthur and Lex Larson assert that by 1980, "most of the early judicial
resistance to the concept of harassment as discrimination had melted
away "27 As if to signify the concept's acceptance, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) issued its sexual harassment guidelines
during that year.' Although they do not bind the courts,29 the guidelines
provide a useful framework for describing Title VH sexual harassment
law " The guidelines begin by making "sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"
potential candidates for Title VII liability 3 However, such behavior does
not violate Title VII unless it is "[u]nwelcome."
32
sexual harassment of male employees by their female superiors. See id. § 41A.35(a).
However, the Barnes court suggested that Title VII would not forbid sexual harassment by
a bisexual supervisor of either gender who directs his or her attentions to subordinates of both
genders because such behavior "would apply to male and female employees alike." Barnes,
561 F.2d at 990 n.55. Other courts have agreed. Cf. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12,
§ 41A.31.
27 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 41A.22, at 8-158 to -159.
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
29. See Meritor Say Bank v Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (noting that while
guidelines do not control courts, courts may resort to them for guidance).
30. However, the EEOC guidelines' are relatively unhelpful on a question that has
preoccupied many courts: an employer's liability for sexual harassment committed by its
employees. The guidelines make an employer strictly liable for sexual harassment committed
by supervisors, but an employer is held liable for harassment between fellow employees only
when it knew or should have known of the harassment and did not take immediate and
appropriate corrective action. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(c)-(d) (1993). However, in Mentor
Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court held that courts should look
to common-law agency principles for guidance on the employer liability question. Id. at 72.
For a discussion of the courts' subsequent mangling of the common law of agency, see
Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A
Second Look at Mentor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV 1229, 1239-52
(1991). Despite their doctrinal impurity, the courts have reached relatively consistent results
on the employer liability question: (1) in quid pro quo cases, an employer normally is strictly
liable; (2) in cases that involve work environment harassment among fellow employees, an
employer generally is liable only when it had actual or constructive knowledge of the
harassment; and (3) in cases in which a supervisor engages in work environment harassment,
an employer usually is liable only when it had actual or constructive knowledge of the
harassment, although some courts impose strict liability in such cases. Id. at 1237-38.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
32. Id. For an extended discussion of the "unwelcomeness" requirement, see 1
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 41A.32(b)-(e).
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Next, the guidelines make the familiar distinction between quid pro quo
sexual harassment and work environment sexual harassment. They forbid the
former by declaring that the unwelcome sex-related conduct described above
violates Title VII "when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
[or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual."" Thus,
the guidelines clearly include situations in which the harasser expressly links
an employee's submission to tangible job consequences. 4 But as the words
"explicitly or implicitly" suggest, the quid pro quo need not be express 5
and may be implied from the facts and circumstances. 6 Such implied quid
pro quo cases apparently overlap with decisions in the EEOC's second quid
pro quo category- those in which employment decisions are based on the
victim's submission or refusal to submit.3 7 In any category of sexual
harassment case, most courts hold that the victim must suffer a tangible job
detriment of an economic nature in order to recover.3
8
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
34. For example, a supervisor might tell an employee that she must submit to his
advances to retain her job; to avoid being demoted or disciplined; or to get a promotion, a
choice assignment, or a training opportunity. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12,
§ 41A.42, at 8-193.
35. See Huitt v Market St. Hotel Corp., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 538, 541 (D.
Kan. 1993).
36. See infra notes 171-89 and accompanying text (discussing implied quid pro quo sexual
harassment).
37 In cases falling under the EEOC's second quid pro quo category, "the supervisor
propositions the employee, but does not issue any express threats or bribes. After the employee
rejects him, however, she is fired or demoted." 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12,
§ 41A.42, at 8-193. The overlap between this form of harassment and implied quid pro quo
harassment would occur when in addition to the facts just stated, the circumstances surrounding
the proposition suggest that accepting it or rejecting it will have employment consequences.
38. See, e.g., Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (requiring
proof that employee's reaction to harassment affected tangible aspects of her compensation,
terms, privileges, or conditions of employment); Saxton v. AT&T, 785 F Supp. 760, 765
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (requiring denial of some economic employment benefit), aff'd on other
grounds, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993); Babcock v. Frank, 783.F Supp. 800, 807 (S.D.N.Y
1992) (requiring economic injury resulting from employer's denial of concrete employment
benefit); 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 41A.41, at 8-191 (noting that harassment must
result in tangible economic consequences). But see Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,
778-79 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that actual economic loss is not necessary in quid pro quo case;
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However, neither a quid pro quo nor a tangible job detriment is
necessary when the sex-related conduct "has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."39 This "work
environment" sexual harassment typically involves unwelcome sex-related
inquiries, jokes, slurs, propositions, touchings, and other kinds of abuse
directed at an employee by either a supervisor or a fellow worker.' For
Title VH liability to exist, these activities must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-one
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.41 However, they
need not cause the victim actual, concrete psychological harm.42 Still, the
victim must at least perceive the environment as abusive in order to
recover.
43
instead, inquiry is merely whether supervisor linked tangible job benefits to victim's rejection
or acceptance of sexual advances), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W 3724 (U.S. Apr. 22,
1994) (No. 93-1674).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1993); see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64-65 (1986) (specifically rejecting claim that tangible economic loss is required in work
environment harassment cases); see also Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th
Cir. 1988) (omitting mention of tangible job detriment when stating requirements for successful
work environment sexual harassment claim); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d
1554, 1557 (1ith Cir. 1987) (same).
40. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,254-55 (4th Cir. 1983) (involving work environment
sexual harassment by fellow workers); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939-40, 943-44 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (involving work environment sexual harassment by supervisors). In addition,
harassment is actionable when it is based on gender even though it is not sexual. See Gus
Constr., 842 F.2d at 1013-14 (holding that calling female employee "Herpes" and urinating into
gas tank of another female employee's car both are actionable).
41. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993); see Meritor, 477 U.S. at
67 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 904) (holding that actionable sexual harassment must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of victim's employment and create abusive
working environment). For a discussion of the factors that determine whether a working
environment is hostile or abusive, see infra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
By using the term "reasonable person," the Harris Court may have resolved the dispute
over whether offensiveness and abuse should be tested by a "reasonable person," "reasonable
woman," or "reasonable victim" standard. For a discussion of these competing standards, see
I LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 41.A44(d)-(e). The Court did not discuss the issue,
however.
42. See Hams, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
43. Id. at 370-71.
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B. Sexual Favontism Under Title VII
After asserting that gender is "incidental to the claim of abuse,"I the
district court in the 1976 Tomkzns case developed another argument against
Title VII sexual harassment claims. "[T]he pleadings in this case," the court
noted, "aver that the supervisor's advances were spurned. Had they been
accepted, however, and plaintiff thereby preferred, could coworkers be heard
to complain in federal court as well? It is clear that such a claim is simply
without the scope of the Act."45 What supposedly was clear in 1976,
however, became muddy soon thereafter. The EEOC's 1980 sexual
harassment guidelines conclude with the following statement: "Where
employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's
submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual favors,
the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other
persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or
benefit. "I
The EEOC's apparent recognition of a Title VII sexual favoritism
claim47 did not bear fruit until the mid-1980s. 4 The first decision clearly
recognizing the theory, King v Palmer,49 involved a female nurse who
complained that she was denied a promotion in favor of a less qualified
female nurse because the other nurse had a sexual relationship with the male
44. Tomkins v Public Serv Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (quoting
Tonkins).
45. Tomkmns, 422 F Supp. at 556.
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1993).
47 Actually, the EEOC does not support all Title VII sexual favoritism claims. See
infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC's 1990 Policy Guide on sexual
favoritism).
48. Toscano v Nimmo, 570 F Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983), typically is identified as
the first Title VII sexual favoritism case. See Van Tol, supra note 12, at 154. Toscano,
however, is better classified as an implied quid pro quo sexual harassment case in which
sexual favoritism played a significant role. See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text
(discussing Toscano).
49 598 F Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1984). For another early decision recognizing the sexual
favoritism theory, see Priest v Rotary, 634 F Supp. 571, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1986). For an
early state case recognizing the theory, see Kersul v Skulls Angels Inc., 495 N.Y.S.2d 886,
888-89 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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doctor who promoted her." For two reasons, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia quickly concluded that the plaintiff's claim
was cognizable under Title VII. First, the EEOC's guidelines supported
it.5 Second, when sexual favoritism occurs, sex is "for no legitimate
reason a substantial factor in the discrimination."52 Due to the technicalities
of Title VII's "disparate treatment" method of proof,53 however, the district
court denied the plaintiff's claim.' Even though the plaintiff made out a
prima facie case and even though the employer's justification for its decision
was clearly pretextual, she failed to meet her burden of persuasion because
there was no direct evidence of a sexual relationship between the doctor and
his alleged paramour.5 Because it completely disagreed with the district
court on this point, the court of appeals reversed.56 In the process, though,
50. King v. Palmer, 598 F Supp. 65, 66 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
51. Id. at 67
52. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
53. For a discussion of the disparate treatment method of proof, see BARBARA L. SCHLE
& PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1291-1324 (2d ed. 1983). But see
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746-49 (1993) (altering framework of
proof).
54. King, 598 F Supp. at 68.
55. Id. At the time that King v. Palmer was decided, disparate treatment cases usually
proceeded as follows: (1) the plaintiff had to prove a prima facie case or else lose his suit; (2)
if the plaintiff was successful, then the employer had to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the challenged decision or suffer the same fate; and (3) if the employer met this
burden, then the plaintiff had to show that the proffered justification was a pretext for
discrimination or the defendant would prevail. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at
1298-1300, 1313-14.
However, the version of the disparate treatment method applied by the district court in
King differed somewhat from this model. According to the district court, the plaintiff was not
automatically entitled to judgment once she established a prima facie case and the defendant
failed to produce evidence that would allow a fact finder rationally to conclude that the
defendant acted from a nondiscriminatory motive. King, 598 F Supp. at 67 Instead, "[t]he
plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion, and once the Court has heard the evidence on both
sides, it must decide the ultimate question of discrimination based on all the evidence with no
presumptions in favor of either side." Id. Although the matter is of no concern here, the
district court's position seems to resemble the position recently adopted by the Supreme Court.
See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747-49.
56. King v Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1985). First, the court of appeals
rejected the district court's apparent requirement that the plaintiff produce proof of an
"explicit" sexual relationship between supervisor and paramour. See itd. at 882. More
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 547 (1994)
the court of appeals expressed its agreement with the district court on the
issue of concern here: the existence of a Title VII cause of action for sexual
favoritismY
However, King v Palmer quickly was countered by the Second
Circuit's 1986 decision in DeCintio v Westchester County Medical
Center 11 In DeCintio, seven male respiratory therapists complained that
they had been unfairly disqualified from promotion to a higher position so
that the administrator making the promotion could elevate a woman with
whom he was having a consensual romantic relationship.5 9 In rejecting
their Title VII claim, the court began by noting that Title VII forbids
discrimnation based on gender, but not discrimination based on sexual
activity irrespective of gender.' In all the cases in which Title VII sex
discrimination liability has been found, it continued, "there existed a causal
connection between the gender of the individual or class [claiming relief] and
the resultant preference or disparity "61 Here, however, the plaintiffs
"were not prejudiced because of their status as males; rather, they were
discriminated against because [the administrator] preferred his paramour.
[The plaintiffs] faced exactly the same predicament as that faced by any
woman applicant for the promotion. "62 Then the court raised a practical
concern: Allowing Title VII recovery for sexual favoritism "would involve
importantly, the court of appeals held that "a plaintiff who establishes a prnmafacie case of
intentional discrimination and who discredits the defendants' rebuttal should prevail, even if
he or she has offered no direct evidence of discrimination." Id. at 881. This is consistent
with the usual model of the disparate treatment method. See supra note 55 (discussing
disparate treatment method).
57 "We agree with the District Court's conclusion and its rationale: that unlawful sex
discrimination occurs whenever sex is 'for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the
discrimination."' King, 778 F.2d at 880 (quoting King, 598 F Supp. at 66-67 (quoting
Bundy v Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981))). Moreover, on appeal both parties
agreed that the plaintiffs allegation of sexual favoritism presented "a cognizable cause of
action under statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in employment." Id.
58. 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
59. DeCintio v Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987).
60. Id. at 306.
61. Id. at 307
62. Id. at 308.
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the EEOC and the federal courts in the policing of intimate relationships."63
The Second Circuit also tried to qualify the EEOC guidelines' endorsement
of sexual favoritism claims by limiting the guidelines' application to
situations in which the favoritism resulted from a coerced sexual relation-
ship.' However, it did not specifically address King's argument that
gender is a substantial factor in sexual favoritism.65
Since the King-DeCintio face-off,' almost all courts considering the
sexual favoritism issue have followed DeCintio by rejecting the idea that
Title VII forbids sexual favoritism as such.6' Like the DeCintio court,
these courts have held that discrimination on the basis of a consensual
romantic or sexual relationship does not constitute sex discrimination under
Title VII." And in the lone apparent exception, the plaintiff failed to
63. Id.
64. Id. at 307-08. The court attempted to limit the EEOC guidelines' endorsement of
sexual favoritism claims by fastening on the word "submission" in the guidelines. Id., see
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1993). For an argument that in such cases, the victim of sexual
favoritism should have standing to sue on behalf of the victim of sexual harassment, see infra
notes 131-70 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing argument in King that gender
is substantial factor in sexual favoritism). The DeCintlo court did try to distinguish King,
however. In an apparent reference to the parties' agreement on the subject in King, see supra
note 57, the DeCintio court claimed that the sexual favoritism issue was not presented on
appeal in King. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307 The Second Circuit also noted that the District
of Columbia Circuit, while denying a rehearing en banc in King, emphasized that the sexual
favoritism issue had not been presented on appeal. Id., see King v Palmer, 778 F.2d 878,
883 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (denying rehearing en bane). Both arguments, however, ignore the
King court's enthusiastic endorsement of the sexual favoritism theory See id. at 880 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); see also supra note 57
66. For further discussion of King and DeCintio, see Manemann, supra note 12, at 625-
34.
67 By sexual favoritism "as such," I mean sexual favoritism that is not factually linked
to sexual harassment and is not part of a sexual harassment claim. Sexual favoritism's role
in sexual harassment litigation will comprise much of this Article. See generally infra notes
131-225 and accompanying text.
68. See Mundy v Palmetto Ford, Inc., No. 92-1041, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19588,
at *5 (4th Cir. July 27, 1993) (citing DeCintio) (holding that for Title VII purposes, no
justification exists for defining "sex" so broadly as to include ongoing, voluntary, romantic
engagement); Piech v Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F Supp. 825, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(holding that preference for paramour is not discrimination on basis of gender); Ayers v.
AT&T, 826 F Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that favoring paramour does not
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recover. 9 Some of the courts that hold that sexual favoritism is not sex
discrimination provide little justification for that conclusion." Among the
courts that do attempt to justify their holdings, the reasons vary To one
court, favoring a paramour does not violate Title VII because it "is not based
violate Title VII); Parrish v English Am. Tailoring Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
567, 569 (D. Md. 1988) (citing Autry v North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 820
F.2d 1384 (4th Cir. 1987)) (holding that Title VII does not forbid discrimination based upon
sexual affiliations); Miller v Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F Supp. 495, 501 (W.D. Pa.)
(citing DeCintio) (holding that preferential treatment on basis of consensual romantic
relationship between supervisor and employee is not gender-based discrimination), aff'd
mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
Several state courts interpreting statutes resembling Title VII have reached the same
conclusion. See Polk v Pollard, 539 So. 2d 675, 678 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
victim of sexual favoritism did not suffer discrimination on basis of her gender); Hickman v
W-S Equip. Co., 438 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that sexual
favoritism is unrelated to victim's gender and therefore is not actionable under state law
forbidding sex discrimination in employment); Kryeski v Schott Glass Technologies, Inc.,
626 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that discrimination resulting only from
sexual favoritism toward coworker is not gender discrimination), appeal denied, 639 A.2d
29 (Pa. 1994); cf. Erickson v Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 803 (N.J. 1990)
(holding that on facts of case, at least, male employee's sexual favoritism claim fails because
he would have suffered same fate were he female); Nicolo v Citibank N.Y State, 554
N.Y.S.2d 795, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (citing Priest v Rotary, 634 F Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal.
1986)) (holding that although sexual favoritism could create liability for sexual harassment,
no liability attaches for isolated act of sexual favoritism involving one employee).
However, favoritism accompanying a nonconsensual sexual relationship between
supervisor and paramour may be actionable. See Miller, 679 F Supp. at 501 (asserting only
that preference resulting from consensual relationship is not sex discrimination); Erickson,
569 A.2d at 803 (citing DeCintio) (noting that unsuccessful sexual favoritism plaintiff did not
allege that relationship between supervisor and paramour was coercive); see also supra note
64 and accompanying text (noting Second Circuit's attempt to limit EEOC guidelines'
endorsement of sexual favoritism claims to cases of nonconsensual relationships). Most
likely, however, the claim would not be for sexual favoritism; rather, the victim of such
favoritism might have standing to sue for the quid pro quo harassment inflicted upon the
paramour. See infra notes 131-70 and accompanying text (discussing standing issue).
69. In Candelore v Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1992), the
court quoted the EEOC guidelines' sexual favoritism provision, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (g)
(1993), but held for the defendant because the plaintiff never identified the employment
benefits that she was denied, and that less qualified co-employees received, because they
submitted to sexual advances and she did not. Candelore, 975 F.2d at 590.
70. See Mundy v Palmetto Ford, Inc., No. 92-1041, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19588,
at *5 (4th Cir. July'27, 1993); Parrish v English Am. Tailoring Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 567, 569 (D. Md. 1988).
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on sexism (whether gender or activity), but is rather more akin to nepo-
tism." But the most common argument is DeCintio's contention that
because an employee of the opposite sex could have suffered the same fate,
the plaintiff was not disadvantaged because of his or her gender.'
According to several courts, however, sexual favoritism can consti-
tute, or contribute to, actionable sexual harassment. 3 For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a
consensual romantic relationship between a supervisor and a subordinate can
create a workplace environment that violates Title VII.74 In so holding, the
court observed that "[t]he theoretical basis for the kind of environmental
claim alleged here is that the sexual relationship impresses the workplace
with such a cast that the plaintiff is made to feel that she is judged only by
her sexuality "15 Somewhat more precisely, the "sexually charged"
atmosphere created by a consensual romantic relationship might be
discriminatory "if sexual discourse displaced standard business procedure in
71. Ayers v AT&T, 826 F Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
72. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308; see Miller v Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F Supp.
495, 501 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Piech v Arthur
Andersen & Co., 841 F Supp. 825, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that plaintiff is in same
position as any other male or female employee who did not have sexual relationship with
decision maker). For some state cases to the same effect, see Polk v Pollard, 539 So. 2d
675, 677 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Hickman v W-S Equip. Co., 438 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1989); Erickson v Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 803 (N.J. 1990).
73. Some of the courts that deny claims for sexual favoritism as such also hold or
suggest that sexual favoritism is useful in establishing a sexual harassment claim. See Piech
v Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F Supp. 825, 829-30 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that plaintiff's
sexual favoritism allegations fit definition of quid pro quo harassment); cf. Miller v
Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F Supp. 495, 501-02 (W.D. Pa.) (noting that plaintiffs work
environment harassment claim contained some apparent instances of favoritism, yet not
objecting to their inclusion despite denying favoritism claim), aff'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1988).
74. See Drinkwater v Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 859-62 (3d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing that sexual favoritism may contribute to work environment sexual harassment
claim, but ultimately holding for defendant). For further discussion of Drinkwater, see infra
notes 215-23 and accompanying text. Also holding that sexual favoritism may constitute, or
contribute to, a work environment sexual harassment claim are Candelore v Clark County
Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding for defendant) and Broderick v
Ruder, 685 F Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding for plaintiff). For further
discussion and criticism of Broderick, see infra notes 192-214 and accompanying text.
75. Drnkwater, 904 F.2d at 861 n.15.
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a way that prevented plaintiff from working in an environment in which she
could be evaluated on grounds other than her sexuality "76 Sexual
favoritism also might contribute to, or constitute evidence for, a successful
implied quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. 7 This seems most likely
to happen when the favoritism and the supervisor-paramour relationship,
along with other evidence, suggest a link between submission and job
advancement. 78 For example, suppose that a supervisor propositions his
subordinate without ever mentioning a quid pro quo, but does so after having
favored other women who submitted, or having punished still other women
who refused, or both. If the subordinate later suffers a tangible job
detriment, the evidence of sexual favoritism might contribute to a successful
implied quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.
III. Should Sexual Favontism Be Actionable Under Title VII?
As we have just seen, most courts do not recognize Title VII sexual
favoritism claims outside the sexual harassment context. In the process, they
generally deny that sexual favoritism is sex discrimination for Title VII
purposes. In an effort to determine whether this result is correct, this Part
examines two legal arguments for the proposition that sexual favoritism is
sex discrimination under Title VII. The first is that Title VII's prohibition
of "sex" discrimination includes discrimination based on sexual activity
The second is that sexual favoritism is gender-based discrimination. After
concluding that neither argument is persuasive and that Title VII does not
prohibit sexual favoritism as such, the Part bolsters these conclusions by
adducing some ethical and policy reasons for removing sexual favoritism
from Title VII's reach.
76. Id. at 862.
77 See Dirksen v. City of Springfield, 842 F Supp. 1117, 1121-22 (C.D. II!. 1994);
Piech, 841 F. Supp. at 829-30; Toscano v Nimmo, 570 F Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983).
For further discussion of the use of evidence of sexual favoritism in an implied quid pro quo
harassment claim, see ifra notes 171-89 and accompanying text.
78. "[Plaintiff's] allegations regarding the favored female coworker who received a
promotion while involved romantically with a decision-maker may be considered simply
circumstantial evidence that her employer conditioned employment benefits on the granting
of sexual favors." Piech, 841 F Supp. at 830; see Toscano, 570 F Supp. at 1199. For
further discussion of Toscano, see infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
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A. Does "Sex" Include Sexual Activity?
Title VII forbids employment discrimination on the basis of "sex. "
The most direct route to the conclusion that sexual favoritism violates Title
VII is to assert that sex discrimnation includes discrimination on the basis
of sexual activity In the typical sexual favoritism case, a supervisor favors
the paramour for (among other things) engaging in sexual relations with him.
Here, one can argue, the employer violates Title VII because a proscribed
criterion-sexual activity-motivates both the paramour's advancement and
other employees' failure to advance.
Commentators sometimes suggest that because the relevant legislative
history is so scanty,80 it is unclear whether Congress meant to limit "sex"
to gender when it amended Title VII to include sex discrunation.8s
Whatever its other deficiencies, however, the legislative history is reason-
ably clear on this particular subject. So far as can be determined, it is
devoid of meamngfil references to sexuality, sexual activity, or sexual
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-(d) (1988).
80. After a relatively brief debate, the House of Representatives amended Title VII to
include sex discrimination on February 8, 1964. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964). The
House passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act on February 10, id. at 2804, and the Senate on June
19. Id. at 14,511. The amendment is widely viewed as a last-ditch effort to derail the full
act, see Manemann, supra note 12, at 638 & n.180, but it passed the House by a vote of 168
to 133. 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964). I have been unable to find any Senate discussion of
the sex-discrimination ban prior to Senate passage of the act. Nor, apparently, has at least
one other observer. See N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII:
Expanding Male Standing to Sue for Injuries Received as a Result of EmployerDiscrimination
Against Females, 64 WASH. L. REv 365, 385 (1989) (noting that sex amendment went
without challenge and virtually without comment even though bill went through several
months of Senate debate).
81. For example, Mack Player notes:
Congress neither defined nor made clear in the legislative history of
Title VII what it meant by the term "sex." Lexically, the term has two
acceptable meanings: (1) "Division oforganisms distinguished respectively as
male or female," in a word "gender," or (2) "The sum of the structural,
functional, and behavioral characteristics of living beings that subserve
reproduction .," simply stated, "sexuality "
PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.25(a), at 239 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1062 (1976)). Player then asserts that the limitation of sex to gender is a "narrow
construction" that the courts have merely "divined." Id., see also Manemann, supra note 12,
at 638-39 (noting limited guidance from Title VII's legislative history on question of whether
"sex" is limited to gender).
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orientation.' Instead, it stresses gender at every turn. The amendment's
sponsor opened his remarks by stating that its aim was to prevent discrimi-
nation against women.' A female supporter claimed that "a vote against
this amendment today by a white man is a vote against his wife, or his
widow, or his daughter, or his sister."' Another referred to the time of
the debate as "ladies' afternoon."'  Still another asserted that "[iln this
amendment we seek equal opportunity in employment for women. No
more-no less. "I Just before the vote, a male supporter of the amendment
said that its aim was "to protect the employment rights of all women."'
Foes of the amendment were no less unanimous in the conclusion that its
concern was gender."
To be sure, the legislative history's preoccupation with gender does
not logically entail the rejection of sexuality as an additional forbidden
criterion. Although nothing in the history supports that reading of Title VII,
nothing specifically rejects it either. The courts, however, have declined to
exploit this possibility While denying Title VII claims by homosexuals,
transsexuals, and those deemed effeminate, the courts have routinely asserted
that Title VII only bans gender-based discrimination. 9 As some of these
82. See 110 CONG. RFc. 2577-84 (1964); cf. Ulane v Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting no mention of homosexuality, transvestitism, or
transsexuality in legislative history), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
83. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith). Representative Smith
almost certainly did not offer the amendment because he agreed with its substance. Although
he said that "I am serious about this thing," Representative Smith's main argument for the
amendment was a letter from a woman who complained about the statistical imbalance
between men and women and its implications for each woman's opportunity to obtain a
husband. Id. The usual explanation for Smith's offering the amendment is his expectation
that its passage would derail passage of the full act. See Manemann, supra note 12, at 638
& n.180.
84. 110 CONG. REc. 2580 (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
85. Id. at 2582 (statement of Rep. May); see also id. at 2581 (statement of Rep. Green)
(referring to proceedings as "women's afternoon").
86. Id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Kelly).
87 Id. at 2584 (statement of Rep. Gathings).
88. See, e.g., id. at 2577-78 (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 2581-82 (statement of
Rep. Green); id. at 2584 (statement of Rep. Roosevelt).
89. See, e.g., Ulane v Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984)
(denying Title VII discrimination claim based on transsexuality), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017
(1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748,750 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); DeSantis
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courts note, moreover, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed several unsuccessful
attempts to amend Title VII to ban discrimnation on the basis of affectional
or sexual orientation.' Although Congress's failure to act on these bills
does not speak directly to the sexual favoritism issue, it does suggest a
general congressional disposition to linut "sex" to gender in Title VII.
B. Is Sexual Favontism Gender-Based Discrmination?
Even if "sex" means gender for Title VII purposes, sexual favoritism
might qualify as gender-based discrimination. The rationale for this position
is that like sexual harassment,9' sexual favoritism almost inevitably
involves gender. Indeed, a paramour's gender normally is critical to the
person who discriminates in her favor. For example, suppose that a
heterosexual supervisor promotes his paramour over several other deserving
subordinates because she delights him sexually Here, the sexual attraction
and satisfaction that motivate the discrimination are inseparable from the
paramour's gender. Presumably, the supervisor would not have reacted in
the same way to a male subordinate.'
1 The But-For Standard
The preceding argument focuses on the employer's (or supervisor's)
motives for engaging in sexual favoritism. Some courts that reject sexual
favoritism claims, however, focus less on those motives than on the parties
v Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying Title VII
discrimination claim based on homosexuality); Smith v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325,
326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (denying Title VII discrimination claim based on effeminacy); see also
PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.25(a) (concluding that in courts' view, Title VII's prohibition of
sex discrimination refers only to gender and not to sexuality, sexual practices, or sexual
preferences); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at 430 (asserting that usual rationale of
courts is that "sex" equals gender for Title VII purposes).
90. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-86; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; see also Manemann,
supra note 12, at 642 & n.210.
91. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (noting role of gender in sexual
harassment claims).
92. See PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.25(d)(2), at 251 & n.68 (suggesting that sexual
favoritism can be regarded as actionable "sex-plus" discrimination: discrimination on basis
of gender plus some other factor such as sex appeal or willingness to engage in sexual
relationship). For a discussion of sex-plus discrimination, see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra
note 53, at 403-17
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potentially affected by the employer's actions. As we have seen, such courts
typically say that sexual favoritism cannot be sex discrimination because its
victims can be either male or female.' As we also have seen, a similar
argument proved unpersuasive in the sexual harassment context. 94 Even
though both sexes can suffer sexual harassment, in any particular case the
victim's gender would be a but-for cause of the harassment she suffered.95
In sexual favoritism cases, however, the employer focuses on the para-
mour's gender rather than victim's gender. Until the late 1980s, this
difference was sufficient to distinguish sexual favoritism claims from sexual
harassment clais and to put the former outside the reach of Title VII.
Title VII's basic liability provision makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual "because of
sex. 1196 Before 1989, 9 the Supreme Court usually read this language
as inposing a but-for causation test.98 As the Court articulated this test, a
Title VII sex discrimnation recovery requires "treatment of a person in a
manner which but for that person's sex would be different."I To elabo-
rate:
In determining whether a particular factor was a but-for cause of a
given event, we begin by assuming that that factor was present at the
time of the event, and then ask whether, even if that factor had been
93. See supra notes 62, 72 and accompanying text (noting argument that sexual
favoritism plaintiff suffers no discrimination because both sexes are equally disadvantaged).
94. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (noting role of gender in sexual
harassment claims).
95. See Barnes v Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 & n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
97 As we will see shortly, Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
eliminated the but-for standard in favor of a standard that focuses on the defendant's motive,
and a 1991 amendment to Title VII solidified the change. See infra notes 103-10 and
accompanying text (discussing Hopkins).
98. See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1081 (1983) (opinion of Marshall, J.);
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683 (1983); City of
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). The lower
federal courts, however, did not always agree that a but-for test applied. See Hopkins, 490
U.S. at 238 n.2.
99 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711 (quoting Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination and Title WI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv L. Rnv 1109, 1170
(1971)).
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absent, the event nevertheless would have transpired m the same
way 100
Here, the relevant "event" is the' employment decision challenged by a
victim of sexual favoritism, and the relevant "factor" is the victim's gender.
Because the event normally would occur even if the factor were ab-
sent-even if the claimant's gender were different-there is no but-for
causation between factor and event and thus no liability under Title VII.
2. The "Motivating Factor" Test
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended Title VII to
include a new section 703(m), which states: "Except as otherwise provided
in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.""' As the 1991 Act's legislative
history makes clear,"° section 703(m) was intended to overrule one
portion of the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v
Hopkins. 13 Hopkns was a "mixed motives" case in which the female
claimant's failure to make partner at an accounting firm was attributable both
to gender discrimination (sexual stereotyping) and to a neutral factor (her
abrasiveness)." ° Early in his opinion, Justice Brennan, writing for a four-
100. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240. Hopkins, however, rejected the but-for test that it
articulated so well. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (noting Hopkins Court's
rejection of but-for standard).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. 11 1991). However, when an employer
demonstrates that it would have taken the same action even without the discrimination, the
court cannot award damages or issue an order requiring the plaintiff's admission, reinstate-
ment, hiring, promotion, or payment. id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
102. See generally H.R. REP No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 45-49 (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583-87 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT I]; H.R. REP No. 40(1),
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 16-19 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 695, 709-12
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT Il].
103. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
104. See Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-36 (1989) (opinion of
Brennan, J.). The gist of the sexual stereotyping claim was that Hopkins suffered
discrimination because she failed to act in a stereotypically "feminine" fashion. Id. at 235.
The portion of the Court's opinion treating sexual stereotyping as actionable sex discrimina-
tion, see id. at 250-52, was unaffected by § 703(m). See HOUSE REPORT I, supra note 102,
at 45 n.39, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583 n.39.
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Justice plurality, rejected a but-for causation standard and asserted instead
that discrimination is "because of" sex when the employer relies upon sex-
based considerations in making the challenged decision. 5 Under a but-for
test, the plaintiff presumably could not have recovered if she would have
been rejected in any event because of her abrasiveness. The plurality's new
standard seemed to remove this obstacle to recovery But soon thereafter the
plurality reversed course and held that in order to preserve employers'
freedom of choice, "an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even
if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same
decision regarding a particular person."" 6  It was this last aspect of
Hopkins that Congress meant to overrule by enacting section 703(m).1'1
105. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240-42 (opinion of Brennan, J.). In the plurality's view,
apparently, the "because of" test would be satisfied if gender played any role in the challenged
decision. See id. at 240-41. As the plurality later elaborated:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision
what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those
reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.
Id. at 250; see id. at 240 (interpreting Title VII to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions).
It is unclear what causation standard Justice White's concurrence adopted. See id. at
259 (White, J., concurring) (finding no need to discuss whether adopted standard is but-for
causation in another guise). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, however, did adopt a but-
for test, see id. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice Kennedy's dissent apparently
did the same. See id. at 282-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As if to underline Hopkins's
uncertainty on the causation question, the Court enunciated a but-for standard under Title VII
as late as 1991. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
106. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 242 (opinion of Brennan, J.); see id. at 252-53 (requiring that
employer prove by preponderance of evidence that it would have come to same decision in
absence of discrimination). Justice White, at least, joined the four-Justice plurality on this
point. See id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurnng) (asserting that once unlawful motive is shown
to be substantial factor in decision, burden then shifts to employer to demonstrate by
preponderance of evidence that it would have reached same decision in absence of wrongful
motive). Because the court of appeals had held that Price Waterhouse must make this showing
by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion. Id. at 258 (opinion of Brennan, J.). On remand, Hopkins
eventually triumphed. See Hopkins v Price Waterhouse, 737 F Supp. 1202, 1207 (D.D.C.),
aff'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
107 As a House Report stated, the amendment
overturns one aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins ., by adding a new subsection to Title VII. It provides that an
unlawful employment practice is established when a complaining party
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For present purposes, section 703(m)'s most important implication is
that it appears to permit Title VII sexual favoritism claims. As I conceded
earlier, gender is a "motivating factor" in the typical sexual favoritism
case.108  Section 703(m) forbids employment practices motivated by
gender."° If read literally, therefore, section 703(m) appears to make
sexual favoritism unlawful under Title VII.iio Moreover, nothing in the
section's legislative history suggests that Congress intended to override
Hopkns's shift from a but-for standard (which would block paramour
claims) to the view that discrimmation exists anytime sex-based consider-
demonstrates that sex, race, color, religion, or national origin was a contribut-
ing factor for an employment practice, even though other factors also contribut-
ed to such practice.
HOUSE REPORT H, supra note 102, at 16-17, reprnted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 709-10
(citation omitted); see HOUSE REPORT I, supra note 102, at 48, repnnted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 586. The House Report elaborated:
The Court's holding in Price Waterhouse severely undermines
protections against intentional employment discrimination by allowing such
discrimination to escape sanction completely under Title VII. Under this
holding, even if a court finds that a Title VII defendant has clearly engaged in
intentional discrimination, that court is powerless to end that abuse if the
particular plaintiff who brought the case would have suffered the disputed
employment action for some alternative, legitimate reason.
If Title VII's ban on discrimination in employment is to be meaningful,
proven victims of intentional discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and
perpetrators of discrimination must be held liable for their actions.
In providing liability for discrimination that is a "contributing factor,"
the Committee intends to restore the rule applied by the majority of the circuits
prior to the Price Waterhouse decision that any discrimination that is actually
shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may be the subject of
liability.
HOUSE REPORT II, supra note 102, at 18, reprntedn 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 711.
108. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. 11 1991).
110. Some language in the legislative history might support this reading of § 703(m).
See HOUSE REPORT II, supra note 102, at2, reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 695 ("[A]ny
reliance on prejudice in making employment decisions is illegal."); id. at 17, reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 710 ("When enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made
clear that it intended to prohibit all invidious consideration of sex, race, color, religion, or
national origin in employment decisions.").
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ations motivate an employer (which presumably allows paramour claims).
Indeed, section 703(m)'s "motivating factor" language strongly suggests that
Congress endorsed this particular aspect of Hoplans.
3. The Language of Section 703(a)
Despite its apparent implications for sexual favoritism claims, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not touch Title VII's basic liability provision,
section 703(a). That section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."'
The section clearly requires that for an unlawful employment practice to
exist, the victim of discrimination must have suffered such discrimination
because of his or her own race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In
sexual favoritism cases, however, the victim's gender typically is irrelevant.
Instead, the asserted sex discrimination in such cases involves the para-
mour's gender. The analysis is the same even if, as is likely, section
703(a)'s "because of" language no longer imposes a but-for causation
requirement." 2  Suppose that "because of sex" simply means
"motivated to any degree by sex." Even so, sexual favoritism normally is
motivated by the paramour's gender, not the victim's. If Paul (who is
heterosexual) promotes Cindy over Bess (or Bob) because Cindy is his lover,
it is Cindy's gender that motivates Paul, not Bess's or Bob's." 3
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added); see id. § 2000e-2(a)(2), (b)-(c)
(containing similar structure and language).
112. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text (noting rejection of but-for test in
favor of motivating factor test).
113. Conceivably, however, Bob's gender would help explain his plight. As Mack
Player has argued:
When a female employee is promoted over a male employee because she is
having a sexual affair with the supervisor, this should constitute sex
discrimination against the rejected male employee. [H]e was denied the
employment opportunity because he is a male, and the female was given the
job because of her gender.
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Sections 703(a) and 703(m) thus seem to have different implications
for sexual favoritism claims. But the latter section's opening qualifi-
er-"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter"" 4-makes the
conflict easy to resolve. Because section 703(a) clearly speaks to the
"paramour" situation, section 703(m)'s qualifier plainly allows section
703(a) to control that situation. This conclusion is reinforced by the
legislative history of section 703(m), which is almost entirely preoccupied
with Hopkins and which does not mention sexual favoritism claims.
PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.25(d)(2), at 251. In other words, if Paul gave a truthful account
of his reasons for not promoting Bob, see supra note 105, Bob's gender would have been one
of those reasons. In some cases, however, gender may have had nothing to do with Paul's
decision not to promote Bob. For example, Paul may have been so enamored of Cindy that
he could not seriously consider anyone else for the promotion, or he may have been unaware
of Bob's existence.
Based on Player's reasoning, moreover, it is difficult to see how Paul was motivated
by gender when he refused to promote Bess. The difficulty arises from Paul's sexual
preference for women. Given this preference, Paul apparently would have to give some
reason other than Bess's gender if he responded truthfully to a query about his reasons for
preferring Cindy over Bess. If this assertion is correct, and if Player is correct in his
argument that people like Bob have suffered sex discrimination, then we are left with the
anomalous result that Bob could recover for Paul's sexual favoritism, but Bess could not.
This would be true even though Bess suffered the same injury as Bob.
In any event, Player had another argument. "[W]hen one female is promoted over
another female because of sexual willingness, this is an act of discrimination. If females
must meet such conditions not imposed on male applicants, then this selection process
necessarily proceeded along gender specific grounds that violate Title VII." PLAYER, supra
note 4, § 5.25(d)(2), at 251. However, this situation appears to involve express or implied
quid pro quo sexual harassment, which obviously is actionable under Title VII. See supra
notes 33-38,77-78 and accompanying text (discussing sexual favoritism's role in quid pro quo
harassment suits); see also infra notes 171-89 and accompanying text (same). In addition,
this situation excludes the scenario depicted in the previous paragraph. Here, the employer
has set up a two-track system in which men are judged meritocratically, while women must
engage in sexual activity to advance. In the previous scenario, however, the employer had
a two-track system in which women must submit to advance, but (due to Paul's heterosexual-
ity) men have little chance of advancement. Thus, Player's second argument does not resolve
the problem that Bob could recover but Bess could not.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. M 1991).
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C. Sexual Favoritism and Title VII's Forbidden
Grounds for Discrtmination
In the previous subpart, Title VII's language served as the main
reason for denying that sexual favoritism constitutes actionable sex
discrimination. For some readers, this plainest of plain-meaning arguments
should carry the day against Title VII sexual favoritism claims. For others,
however, it may not suffice. People in the latter group are apt to believe
that eliminating workplace sexual favoritism is sufficiently important to
justify circumventing Title VII's language. This subpart tries to defuse that
argument for a Title VII sexual favoritism claim by maintaining that sexual
favontism is morally less objectionable than the forms of discrimination
that Title VII has been held to forbid. Underlying the argument in this
subpart is the assumption that the law cannot eliminate all forms of
115. If this conclusion is correct, it is difficult to accept Joan Van Tol's apparently
unqualified assertion that "[s]exual favoritism is sexual harassment." Van Tol, supra note
12, at 181. This is true, she elaborates, even when the favoritism arises from a consensual
sexual relationship:
When co-workers are damaged by these [consensual] relationships, the
message they receive is that the only way to advance in the workplace is to
"use" or "surrender" one's sexuality This is the same message that victims
of direct sexual harassment receive. This message is just as offensive when
it is communicated to a worker who is not the direct recipient of the
harassment; it should therefore be prohibited by Title VII regardless of the
nature of the underlying relationship.
Id. at 178-79 (footnote omitted). "By imposing a sexual standard to measure employees'
performance and worth," Van Tol concludes, "the employer tells employees that 'their
value is not in their job performance but in their use as sexual objects.'" Id. at 181
(quoting Women in the Workforce: Supreme Court Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 96 (1986) (statement of Sarah Bums, Assistant Director, Georgetown University Law
Center Sex Discrimination Clinic)).
Van Tol's argument seems to have the following form: IfA and B havex in common
and ifx is sufficiently important, thenA = B. Thus, because sexual favoritism and sexual
harassment both send the same message, they are the same phenomenon. What the
argument iguores, of course, are the siguificant ways in which A and B might differ. Even
if Van Tol is correct about the resemblance between sexual harassment and sexual
favoritism, she ignores the morally relevant differences suggested later in this subpart. For
example, being sexually harassed probably is more unpleasant than being disadvantaged by
sexual favoritism. More importantly, the motives underlying sexual favoritism almost
certainly are less blameworthy than those underlying sexual harassment.
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employment discrimination and therefore should focus on its worst
manifestations." 6 In a scheme familiar to ethicists, I divide my argu-
ments into consequentialist and deontological claims. Consequentialist or
teleological moral theories usually assert that the moral worth of an action
should be judged by that action's consequences." 7 In contrast, deontolog-
ical theories ordinarily say that considerations other than an act's conse-
quences help determine its goodness or badness." 8 Such considerations
may include the innate nature of the act" 9 or the motives that underlie
it. 2 ' Like others who have written about the wrongfulness of different
kinds of discrimination, ' 2 I consider both consequentialist and deontolog-
ical claims relevant to my argument.
1. Consequentialist Considerations
One consequentialist argument for including sexual favoritism within
Title VII's embrace emphasizes meritocratic values." From this point
116. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrnmination Wrong9 Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv 149, 203 (1992) (arguing that
law should not attempt to prohibit all forms of employment discrimination).
117 See PETER A. ANGELES, THE HARPER COLLiNS DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
55, 96 (2d ed. 1992). Utilitarianism is the obvious, but not the only, example of a
consequentialist or teleological moral theory. See WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 34 (2d
ed. 1973) (calling utilitarianism teleological).
118. FRANKENA, supra note 117, at 15.
119. See id. (stating that "certain features of the act itself" help make it right or
obligatory).
120. "It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which
can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will." IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 59 (H.J. Paton trans. 1972). Later, Kant
adds: "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes it is good
through its willing alone-that is, good in itself." Id. at 60.
121. See Alexander, supra note 116, at 154 (stating that reader will find "a somewhat
messy blend of deontological and consequentialist considerations brought to bear on a
variety of forms and contexts of discrimination").
122. Meritocratic values often are invoked in other efforts to expand the coverage of
federal employment discrimination law. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending
Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100
HARv L. REv. 2035, 2035 (1987) (noting that "appearance, like race and gender, is almost
always an illegitimate employment criterion," one "frequently used to make decisions based
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of view, the discrimination that Title VII expressly forbids is bad mainly
because, or when, it deprives people of deserved job benefits. Sexual
favoritism obviously can have the same effect on its victims. For this
reason, one might argue that sexual favoritism is morally indistinguishable
from the types of discrimination that Title VII clearly does proscribe. If
so, one might also desire sexual favoritism's inclusion among Title VII's
forbidden grounds of decision.
One objection to the preceding argument is that it proves too much.
From the reasoning just advanced, Title VII arguably should be read as
banmng discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation, transsexuality,
and appearance, and maybe even as forbidding all employment decisions
made on nonneritocratic grounds. But the obvious rejoinder is to say
"Why not?"'" Rather than arguing that the preceding argument proves
too much, therefore, a better response is to advance morally relevant ways
in which sexual favoritism's consequences differ from the consequences of
the discrimination that Title VII expressly bans. Because it does not
denigrate classes of people or suggest their innate inferiority, for example,
sexual favoritism should be less hurtful to its victims than discrimination
based on race, color, gender, religion, or national origin. For the same
reason, it may not spark quite the same resentments that these forms of
discrimination can produce. Turning to sexual harassment, finally, it is at
least arguable that suffering quid pro quo or work environment harassment
is more unpleasant than being the victim of sexual favoritism.
Even from a completely meritocratic standpoint, it might be safer to
leave workplace sexual favoritism unregulated than to do the same for
discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, and national origin.
For one thing, sexual favoritism probably is less common than these other
kinds of discrimination. For another, because firms tend to perceive affairs
between supervisor and subordinate as a threat to their proper functioning
on personal dislike or prejudicial assumptions rather than actual merit").
123. Cf. PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.25(c)(2), (d)(1)-(2) (appearing to sympathize with
efforts to include sexual orientation, appearance, sexual favoritism, and perhaps trans-
sexuality among Title VIl's forbidden bases of discrimination).
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and thus to their competitive position, 24 firms arguably have an incentive
to penalize such relationships without prodding from the law '2
2. Deontological Differences
The preceding points hopefully go some way toward differentiating
sexual favoritism's morally relevant consequences from the effects of the
discrimination that Title VII clearly bans. The most important bases of
differentiation, however, concern sexual favoritism's nature and underlying
motives and therefore are deontological. One reason for the stress the law
has laid on eliminating race, color, gender, and national origin discrimina-
tion is the immutability of these traits. 26 The sexual attractiveness that
leads a supervisor to favor his paramour, on the other hand, is much less
permanent. While that attractiveness is difficult to separate from the
paramour's gender, gender does not seem to be the most important factor
124. See, e.g., Lee Colby, Regulating Love, PERSONNEL, June 1991, at 23 (detailing
how supervisor-subordinate relationships undermine group solidarity, mainly because
coworkers suspect favoritism); Marilyn M. Kennedy, Romance in the Office, ACROSS THE
BOARD, March 1992, at 23, 24, 26 (noting that top managers punish peers who have affairs
because intraoffice relationships undermine existing alliances, create anger and jealousy, and
also create suspicions of favoritism); Ellen Rapp, DangerousLialsons, WORKING WOMAN,
Feb. 1992, at 56, 59 (noting that affairs between supervisor and subordinate are viewed
negatively by coworkers, who may experience jealousy, anger, and abandonment, and may
therefore be less productive); see also Jonathan Segal, Love: What's Work Got to Do with It?,
HR MAGAZINE, June 1993, at 36, 38 (noting that in addition to dangerous appearance of
favoritism that they can create, romances between superior and subordinate create possibility
of sexual harassment claims).
125. Admittedly, there also may be incentives to penalize many kinds of discrimination
that Title VII clearly forbids. Regarding sexual harassment, for example, see Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex DiscriminationLaws, 56 U. CHI. L. REv 1311, 1321,
1323 (1989) (noting that employers have interest in curbing sexual harassment because it
lowers productivity, offends many workers, and requires that female employees receive a
"compensating differential").
126. See Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) ("[S]ince sex, like race and
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex
would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility '") (quoting Weber v Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). The basic idea, apparently, is that "[m]oral worth must be based
on moral choices, not on [immutable] physical characteristics." Alexander, supra note 116,
at 200 (discussing immutability from Kantian perspective).
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behind the supervisor's preferential behavior. An employer who systemati-
cally discriminates against all women is largely motivated by gender, but a
heterosexual male supervisor who favors one woman over other women
presumably has other things on his mind.
Unlike many people who discriminate on the bases of race, color, sex,
religion, and national origin, moreover, practitioners of sexual favoritism
ordinarily do not disadvantage their victims because they believe that those
people are morally inferior to the people whom they favor.127 Instead, a
supervisor's favoritism toward his paramour more closely resembles the
preference that most people feel for people and groups to whom they are
closely tied-a preference that seems difficult to condemn severely and that
may even be morally obligatory 11 Unlike some forms of sex discrimina-
tion, finally, sexual favoritism is not the product of misogyny' 29 or of the
view that (competence aside) women simply should not perform certain
social functions.
30
IV Sexual Favoritism's Role in Sexual Harassment Claims
If the preceding arguments are at all persuasive, there is little reason
to believe that Title VII bans sexual favoritism as such-sexual favoritism
that is not connected with sexual harassment. Even so, however, Title VII
may provide sexual favoritism's victims with other avenues of relief. Here,
127 On the immorality of biases based on unjustified attributions of moral inferiority,
see Alexander, supra note 116, at 158-63.
128. Larry Alexander articulates this widespread moral intuition as follows:
[P]ersonal commitments, relations, and identifications morally permit and
may require particular persons to have greater moral concern for some than
for others, even if the preferred individuals merit no greater moral concern
from people in general because they possess no greater moral worth than
others. My family and my neighbors are morally no more worthy and
deserving of concern than others' families or neighbors, butthey are certainly
more deserving of my concern.
Id. at 160.
129 See Posner, supra note 125, at 1318. Posner defines misogyny as "an elemental
distaste on the part of men for associating with women at work, not founded on any notions
of productivity or efficiency " Id.
130. See Alexander, supra note 116, at 163-65 (expressing puzzlement about moral
rationale for this view, which is not men's and women's assumed greater or lesser suitability
for certain social tasks).
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I discuss three such possibilities: (1) that when sexual favoritism arises from
the paramour's submission to quid pro quo sexual harassment, the victim of
such favoritism has standing to sue for the harassment; (2) that sexual
favoritism may sometimes help its victims win an inplied quid pro quo
sexual harassment suit; and (3) that sexual favoritism sometimes may
constitute, or contribute to, actionable work environment sexual harassment.
Only occasionally, however, will each prove useful to sexual favoritism's
victims.
A. Standing to Sue
1. Introduction
In 1990, the EEOC endorsed the contention that sexual favoritism is
not sex discrimination because its victims can be either male or female. In
the EEOC's words:
Title VII does not prohibit isolated instances of preferential treatment
based upon consensual romantic relationships. An isolated instance of
favoritism toward a "paramour" (or a spouse, or a friend) may be
unfair, but it does not discnminate against women or men in violation
of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their
genders. A female charging party who is denied an employment
benefit because of such sexual favoritism would not have been treated
more favorably had she been a man nor, conversely, was she treated
less favorably because she was a woman.
131
In support of the preceding statement, the EEOC cited two cases that denied
employer liability for sexual favoritism, both of which limited their holdings
to situations in which the relationship between supervisor and paramour is
consensual. This gave the EEOC latitude to announce a different rule
for cases in which the favoritism results from sexual harassment directed at
the favored party In such cases, "both women and men who were qualified
for but were denied the benefit would have standing to challenge the
favoritism on the basis that they were injured as a result of the discrimination
131. EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6817 (footnote omitted).
132. See DeCintio v Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. dented, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F Supp.
495, 500-01 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
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leveled against the woman who was coerced." 33 This conclusion seems
consistent with the sexual favoritism provision in the EEOC's sexual
harassment guidelines."V
At first glance, it is difficult to square the EEOC's position on
harassment-induced favoritism with its position on favoritism that results
from a consensual relationship. The latter position is that isolated instances
of sexual favoritism based on a consensual romantic relationship do not
constitute sex discrimination because their victims can be either male or
female. But this also is true of favoritism arising from a coerced, noncon-
sensual relationship between the harasser and the favored party Under the
reasomng used to justify the EEOC's position on "consensually-induced"
favoritism, therefore, "harassment-induced" favoritism also should escape
Title VII. Yet the EEOC would allow victims of sexual favoritism to sue in
this second instance. The key to resolving this apparent inconsistency is the
EEOC's assertion that victims of sexual favoritism "have standing to
challenge the favoritism" if it results from sexual harassment directed solely
against the favored party 115
2. Basic Title VII Standing Requirements
Discussions of Title VII standing generally focus on section 706 of the
statute.36 Section 706 requires that a charge be filed with the EEOC or
an appropriate state agency to trigger the Title VII enforcement process.
3 7
Section 706(b) states that the charge may be filed "by or on behalf of a
133. EEOCPolicy Guide, supranote 6, at405:6819. Wherethe sexual relationship was
coerced, the sexual harassment visited upon the favored party almost certainly would be quid
pro quo harassment. The EEOC's position on quid pro quo and work environment
harassment directed at people other than the paramour is discussed in the next two subparts.
See generally infra notes 171-225 and accompanying text.
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (g) (1993); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text
(describing how one court tried to limit application of guidelines to situations in which
paramour was coerced into sexual relationship).
135. EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6819 (emphasis added).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988); see 2 LARSON& LARSON, supra note 12, § 49.12(a),
at 9B-23 to -24 & n.68; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at 986; 1 CHARLES A.
SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.8.1 (2d ed. 1988).
137 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)-(f) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see also PLAYER,
supra note 4, § 5.72, at 470 ("The charge is the document that triggers the enforcement
process.").
SEXUAL FAVORITISM
person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the [EEOC]."'38
Once the government has failed to act on the charge in certain specified
ways, section 706(f)(1) permits a private suit to be brought "by the person
claiming to be aggrieved."'3 The presence of a "person claiming to be
aggrieved," therefore, is vital to private Title VII claims such as suits for
sexual harassment or sexual favoritism. Discussions of the standing question
usually term this party an "aggrieved person" or "person aggrieved. ,"40
3. The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement
Who is an "aggrieved person" or "person aggrieved" for Title VII
purposes? General discussions of this question do not specifically consider
whether victims of sexual favoritism qualify 41 But they do suggest that
in some cases whites and men may qualify as aggrieved persons when they
suffer injury from discrimination against blacks and women, respec-
tively 142 These situations are relevant here because they resemble the
sexual favoritism claims that we are presently considering. Specifically,
both involve: (1) forbidden discrimination against someone (a black person
or a woman, as compared to the favored party who has been coerced into a
sexual relationship) and (2) a plaintiff who has been injured by that
discrimination, but whose injury was not due to his or her own gender (a
white person or a man, as compared to a male or female victim of sexual
favoritism whose recovery is blocked by section 703(a)).
4. Actual Injury
As noted above, an aggrieved person must have been injured, and in
determining whether standing exists, the relevant cases involving whites and
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
139. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
140. See 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 49.12(a), at 9B-24; SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at 987; 1 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 136, § 11.8.1, at 493,
§ 11.8.3, at 498-99.
141. See 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 48.11(a)(1); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN,
supra note 53, at 986-91, 1 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 136, § 11.8.3.
142. See 3 LAPSON& LARSON, supra note 12, § 69.12; 1 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note
136, § 11.8.3.1, at 499-500; Torrey, supra note 80, at 376-80, 383-84, 388-98.
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men usually consider whether the plaintiff suffered actual injury 143 They
suggest that this injury might be either (1) the loss of important benefits
resulting from association with people of the opposite race or gender, or (2)
any other tangible injury resulting from a Title VII violation." Most
decisions of the first sort involve white plaintiffs who acquire standing to
challenge race-based employment discrimination against blacks and other
racial minorities.' 45 One court described the injury that confers standing
143. However, Arthur and Lex Larson say that Title VII standing has two facets: (1) the
"person aggrieved" requirement and (2) constitutional requirements (which Title VII is said
to impose). 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, § 49.12(a)(1), at 9B-23 to -24. The first
requirement largely incorporates the second. See id. Thus, the basic Title VII standing
requirements are the constitutional standards. These are: (1) that the plaintiff suffer some
threatened or actual injury as a result of the illegal action, (2) that the injury interfere with
an interest that is arguably within the zone of interests protected by Title VII, and (3) that the
injury likely will be redressed if the requested relief is granted. Id. § 49.12(a)(2), at 9B-25;
see id. at 9B-25 to -32; Torrey, supra note 80, at 370 ("Th[e] core component of standing
requires a plaintiff to 'allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'") (quoting Allen v
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); id. at 373-75 (discussing zone-of-interests test that some
courts have applied in Title VII cases).
144. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text (discussing actual injury require-
ment).
145. See, e.g., Stewart v Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 848-50 (7th Cir. 1982); Waters v
Heublem, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977);
Bartelson v Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also 3 LARSON
& LARSON, supra note 12, § 69.12 (citing some additional cases); Torrey, supra note 80, at
376-80 (discussing some additional cases).
These cases generally rely on Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Ins..Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972), in which a white plaintiff and a black plaintiff sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1968
for alleged racial discrimination in the renting of units by an apartment complex. Id. at 206.
The question for the Court was whether each plaintiff qualified as a person aggrieved under
the Act. Quoting a Title VII decisior, Hackett v McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446
(3d Cir. 1971), the Court concluded that these words showed "a congressional intention to
define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." Trafficante, 409
U.S. at 209. Under those criteria, the main inquiry was whether the plaintiffs had suffered
injury in fact, and the Court concluded that they had. This injury was "the loss of important
benefits from interracial associations." Id. at 210. The lost benefits in question apparently
were: (1) the lost social benefits of living in an integrated community, (2) the lost business
and professional advantages that would have been acquired through living with members of
minority groups, and (3) the esteem and wealth lost by being stigmatized as residents of a
"white ghetto." Id. at 208. The Court also noted that because private suits were the principal
means of enforcing the Act, only a generous construction of its standing provision could give
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as the loss of "interracial harmony" and "advantageous personal, profes-
sional, or business contacts.""i Much the same reasoning has been
applied in cases granting white plaintiffs standing to challenge work
environments that allegedly are hostile toward racial minorities.4 7
The second form of "actual injury" that confers standing-any other
tangible injury resulting from a Title VII violation-has been emphasized in
sex discrimination cases.'48 In Allen v Amercan Home Foods, Inc.,'49
the relevant plaintiffs were five men who claimed that sex discrimination
against women was a factor in their employer's decision to close the plant
in which they worked. 'I Relying on a decision involving our first "actual
injury" rationale,' the court concluded that Title VII's "person ag-
grieved" language "confers standing to all persons injured by an unlawful
employment practice." 12 Because the plaintiffs obviously were injured by
their employer's allegedly discriminatory decision, they had standing to sue.
"This," the court said, "is as it should be. These males suffered the same
injury as did the females that lost their jobs; [and] the injuries of the males
and females were occasioned by the same corporate decision." 53
the Act vitality See id. at 210-12.
146. Waters v Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 915 (1977).
147 See Clayton v White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 678-80 (8th Cir. 1989);
Smithberg v Merico, Inc., 575 F Supp. 80, 82-83 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
148. For a detailed discussion of standing in sex discrimination cases, see Torrey, supra
note 80, at 383-84, 388-98.
149. 644 F Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
150. Allen v American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F Supp. 1553, 1554-55 (N.D. Ind.
1986).
151. Stewart v Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra note 145 and
accompanying text (discussing rationale behind Stewart).
152. Allen, 644 F Supp. at 1557; see Pennsylvania Nurses Ass'n v Pennsylvania, 55
Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807, 809-11 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (applying Allen to case involving
male nurses whose benefits allegedly were reduced by sex discrimination against women in
female-dominated positions).
153. Allen, 644 F Supp. at 1557
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5. Two Conflicting Lines of Authority
Sexual favoritism that results from sexual harassment against the
favored party resembles the facts in Allen in certain critical respects. In
both situations, we have gender discrimination against women that results
in tangible injury to a third party who has not suffered discrimination due
to his or her own gender. If cases like Allen control, therefore, male or
female victims of sexual favoritism should have standing to attack that
favoritism if it resulted from sexual harassment against the favored party
Although the point is speculative, perhaps those victims also could get
standing under our first rationale. If the loss of "interracial harmony" or
"advantageous personal contacts" confers standing, perhaps the loss of a
"merit-based employee evaluation process" or a "harassment-free work
environment" qualifies as well.
Unfortunately for these arguments, another line of Title VII sex
discrimination cases denies standing in situations like those just discussed.
Worse yet, these cases employ a familiar rationale-the absence of
discriminatory treatment based on one's own gender-to effect the denial.
Like Allen, Patee v Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. 54 involved
male employees who alleged injury resulting from sex discrimination
against women in a traditionally female job category 155 The court denied
the male employees standing because they did "not claim that they have
been discriminated against because they are men."'' 56 The court also
distinguished the cases establishing our first "actual injury" rationale
because the male claimants did not claim "that they have been denied
interpersonal contracts with women or that the alleged sex-based wages
discrimination has deprived them of harmonious relationships.""57 "In
fact," the court continued, "most of their co-workers are women."' 8
154. 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
155. Patee v Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
156. Id. at 478; see Spaulding v University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.)
(denying standing because male employee made no claim that he received lower wage
because of his sex), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); American Fed'n of State, County
& Mun. Employees v County of Nassau, 664 F Supp. 64, 66-67 (E.D.N.Y 1987)
(denying standing because male claimants suffered "no injury qua men").
157 Patee, 803 F.2d at 479.
158. Id.
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Under Patee and similar cases, therefore, standing requires not just
actual injury, but an actual injury resulting from discrimination based on
one's own gender. 59 Because victims of sexual favoritism do not suffer
such discrimination,6( they lack standing to redress the favoritism if the
Patee reasoning controls. Thus, we appear to be left with two conflicting
lines of authority on the question of whether victims of sexual favoritism
have standing to sue when the favoritism results from sexual harassment
against the favored party
6. Two Arguments for Standing
For at least two reasons, the Allen line of cases should prevail and
standing should exist in the situations that I have been discussing. First,
the reasoning of the cases denying standing to men injured by discrimina-
tion against their female coworkers is not especially persuasive. Those
cases basically argue that the male employees cannot sue because their
injuries were not caused by their own gender. As previously argued, this
should prevent the employer's treatment of these men from being an
unlawful employment prctice.161 But does it follow that they lack
standing to sue for sex discrimination against the women? Section 703(a),
Title VII's basic liability provision, makes employment practices unlawful
if they disadvantage any person because of his or her own gender. 62 But
159. The cases are uninformative about the source of the requirement of an actual
injury resulting from discrimination based on one's own gender. Most likely, it reflects
the belief that to be an aggrieved person, one must have a Title VII claim on his or her
own account. Another possibility is that employees who have not suffered discrimination
based on their own gender are not within the "zone of interests" protected by Title VII.
County of Nassau, 664 F Supp. at 66. On the zone of interests notion as a standing
requirement, see supra note 143. As one court stated, male employees should not be able
to "bootstrap their job grievances" into a federal employment discrimination claim just
because they receive a salary "infected" by sex discrimination against female employees.
Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 709 (citing Ruffin v County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1281
(9th Cir.), cert. dented, 445 U.S. 951 (1979)).
160. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (arguing that Title VII's
language blocks sexual favoritism claims).
161. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (arguing that Title VII's
language blocks sexual favoritism claims).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
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section 706, which controls private suits under Title VII, basically gives
any "person claiming to be aggrieved" the right to sue.163 It is possible
that section 703(a) controls the definition of section 706's "person claiming
to be aggrieved." If that were true, the only aggrieved persons would be
those against whom an unlawful employment practice has been committed.
But if this is what Congress intended, it did not make that intent clear.
Indeed, the lack of parallelism between sections 703(a) and 706 suggests
Congress's desire to extend Title VII standing to injured parties other than
those suffering discrimination because of their own gender. 164
A second reason for extending standing to victims of sexual
favoritism where the favoritism resulted from sexual harassment is that the
victims may be the only parties capable of challenging the harassment in a
private Title VII suit. That harassment generally would be of the quid pro
quo variety To recover for quid pro quo harassment, the victim normally
must have suffered some tangible job detriment. 165 Here, however, that
victim also is a favored party whose submission to the harassment may
have brought her a tangible job benefit. 6 6 This being the case, it seems
that if the victim of this favoritism cannot mount a private Title VII suit,
no one can. Thus, if the victim is denied standing, there may be no
163. Id. § 2000e-5(b), (f); see supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
164. Morrison Torrey notes:
While the Act makes employment practices unlawful if they constitute
discrimination against any individual because of "such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin," the private cause of action provision
lacks identical words of limitation. Rather than restricting the right to sue
to an individual discriminated against because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, the statute accords that right to "any person claiming
to be aggrieved" by a violation of the law. By not repeating the restrictive
language, Congress appears to have intended to draw a distinction between
the two sections, with the latter clearly being more expansive.
Torrey, supra note 80, at 372-73 (footnotes omitted).
165. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting requirement of tangible job
detriment in quid pro quo sexual harassment claims).
166. Another reason why the favored party may not be able to sue is that in some
cases the harassment may not have been "unwelcome." See supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text (noting "unwelcomeness" requirement). This would be true when the favored party
willingly submitted in order to get the benefit. For one case in which this may have
occurred, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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effective remedy against the harassment in such cases.1 67 However,
granting the victim standing may not afford an effective remedy either,
because the victim would have to show a coerced sexual relationship
between the harassing supervisor and the favored party This would
require the favored party's cooperation, and such cooperation is unlikely
to be forthcoming. 6  But in some cases there might be other evidence
of the relationship. 69 In addition, Title VII's antiretaliation provision
should help protect a sexually harassed favored party who wants to
testify 170
B. Sexual Favoritism as Implied Quid Pro Quo
Sexual Harassment
Another possible device for attacking sexual favoritism under Title
VII is to argue that sexual favoritism sometimes constitutes sexual
harassment or at least can contribute to a successful sexual harassment
claim. Some forms of sexual favoritism, the EEOC has said, may create
a claim that resembles, or equals, an implied quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment claim. 7i The EEOC's primary example was a situation in which
167 One possible objection to this argument is that if the favored party cannot sue for
quid pro quo harassment because she has not suffered ajob detriment, and if standing gives
the victim no more rights than the favored party possesses, the victim should not recover
either. In my judgment, this technicality yields before the opportunity for rectifying sexual
harassment afforded by letting the victim recover. This is particularly true when we
consider that the victim has suffered a tangible job detriment.
168. See Van Tol, supra note 12, at 179.
169. For example, in King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985), a case
involving a consensual relationship between supervisor and paramour, the plaintiff
introduced evidence showing that the supervisor and the alleged paramour frequently took
long lunches together, that their on-the-job behavior suggested intimacy between them, that
they were observed kissing outside the workplace, that the supervisor often called the
alleged paramour at home, that the pair often stayed out together all night long, and that
the supervisor did not punish the alleged paramour's sloppy and unprofessional job
performance. Id. at 879-80. Reversing a district court decision to the contrary, the court
of appeals refused to require direct proof of a sexual relationship. Id. at 882. See
generally supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (discussing King).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
171. See EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6818-:6820. For a further
discussion of implied quid pro quo sexual harassment claims, see supra notes 33-37 and
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the employer's sexual harassment of the favored party implied that "sex was
generally made a condition for receiving the benefit" that the favored party
obtained."7  Because this implied quid pro quo is general,in it would
apply to female employees" who were eligible for the benefit but who did
not obtain it and thus would give them a quid pro quo harassment suit. 75
accompanying text.
172. EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6818 (emphasis added).
173. Where the condition is not general, however, the victim cannot mount an implied
quid pro quo claim because only the favored party was subjected to the quid pro quo. "For
example, a supervisor may have been interested in only one woman and, thus, have coerced
only her." Id. at 405:6819. In such cases, the EEOC asserted, victims of the resulting
sexual favoritism should have standing to attack the quid pro quo harassment because they
were injured by it. Id. On this standing question, see generally supra notes 131-70 and
accompanying text.
174. In justifying its implied quid pro quo harassment claim, the EEOC stated: "[I]n
order for a woman to have obtained the job benefit at issue, it would have been necessary
to grant sexual favors, a condition that would not have been imposed on-men." EEOC
Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6818. Here, the EEOC evidently contemplated a
situation in which women must grant sexual favors to advance, while men are judged on
merit (or at least on nonsexual criteria). However, it is possible that men as well as women
could be subjected to sexual criteria for advancement. This might occur, for instance,
when anyone effectively must grant sexual favors to obtainjob benefits. When such criteria
are imposed by a heterosexual male superior who pursues women alone, his male
subordinates should have very limited prospects of advancement as long as female
competitors are present and are willing to submit. Thus, the disadvantage that such men
would suffer arguably is motivated to some degree by their own gender. A female victim
of sexual favoritism, however, probably would have difficulty arguing that her disadvantage
was motivated by her gender. If the supervisor gave a truthful account of his reasons for
preferring the paramour over the female victim, see supra note 105, those reasons
presumably could not include gender. See supra note 113 (discussing gender's role in
sexual favoritism claims). In this second instance, therefore, we may be left with the
anomalous conclusion that male victims of sexual favoritism have a Title VII claim, while
female victims do not.
175. See EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6818 (noting that claim "is
substantially the same as a traditional sexual harassment charge alleging that sexual favors
were implicitly demanded as a 'quid pro quo' in return for job benefits"); see also id. at
405:6820 (noting that "managers who engage in widespread sexual favoritism may [send]
a message that the way for a woman to get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in sexual
conduct or that sexual solicitations are a prerequisite to their fair treatment," and finding
that such behavior can form basis of implicit quid pro quo harassment claim for female
employees).
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Although the EEOC apparently thought that most implied quid pro
quo claims would arise from a coerced sexual relationship between
supervisor and favored party,'76 the EEOC's primary example of such a
claim involved a consensual affair.'" In Toscano v Nimmo, 78 the
supervisor, a self-described "life-long 'womanizer, ' '1 79 telephoned
female employees to proposition them at home, telephoned them at work
to describe his supposed sexual encounters with other female employees,
and engaged in sexually suggestive behavior at work. 0 In her Title VII
sex discrimination suit, the plaintiff claimed that she was denied a deserved
promotion because the supervisor conditioned his promotion decision on the
receipt of sexual favors and promoted his paramour on that basis. The
court apparently treated the plaintiff's claim as a sexual harassment
claim:s
[The plaintiff] maintains that in order for a woman to be selected [for
the position at issue], it was necessary to grant sexual favors, a
condition not imposed on men; this contention is consistent with the
176. Indeed, the heading for this portion of the EEOC's statement reads: "Favoritism
Based Upon Coerced Sexual Conduct May Constitute Quid Pro Quo Harassment." Id. at
405:6818.
177 See Toscano v Nimmo, 570 F Supp. 1197, 1200 (D. Del. 1983); see also
EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6818 (conceding that affair in Toscano was
consensual).
178. 570 F Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983).
179. Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F Supp. 1197, 1200 (D. Del. 1983).
180. Id. at 1199-1201.
181. After describing quid pro quo sexual harassment, the Toscano court said that
[t]his case is slightly different factually from the typical case, although no different in its
theoretical underpinnings." Id. at 1199 The plaintiff did not claim work environment
harassment. Id. at 1204.
Toscano might profitably be compared with Priest v Rotary, 634 F Supp. 571
(N.D. Cal. 1986), in which the defendant advantaged those female employees who
responded favorably to his sexual conduct, disadvantaged those who did not, and fired the
plaintiff because she reacted unfavorably to his sexually suggestive and offensive conduct.
Id. at 576. In Priest, the court found the defendant liable for what apparently was quid pro
quo harassment, see id. at 581, and also found the defendant liable for work environment
harassment. See id. at 582. In addition, the court cited Toscano when it found the
defendant liable for sexual favoritism. See id. at 581-82. But if Toscano was a sexual
harassment case, it could not be the basis for this last finding.
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theory supporting recovery in the typical case. She does not seek to
establish the existence of this condition, however, by showing she
refused specific requests by [the supervisor] for sexual favors and was
then demed the position because of her refusal. Rather, she has
offered proof m the form of evidence of the circumstances of [the
supervisor's] sexual affair with the applicant he in fact selected for the
position.1in
Based on such evidence, the court concluded that "granting sexual favors
was a condition to receiving the position [in question], an employment
practice which discriminated against [the plaintiff] on the basis of sex."",
Toscano v Nimmo is best read as a quid pro quo sexual harassment
case in which evidence of sexual favoritism helped the plaintiff prove that
advancement was generally conditioned on submission to sex-related
behavior and that her own advancement was impliedly conditioned on such
submission.' Although the case suggests the uses to which evidence of
sexual favoritism might be put, it apparently does little to expand the cause
of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment or to assist victims of sexual
favoritism. In a quid pro quo claim, most courts say, the plaintiff must
182. Toscano, 570 F Supp. at 1199 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) in support of
plaintiff's theory); see supra text accompanying note 46 (quoting EEOC's sexual
harassment guidelines). In Toscano, the supervisor once told the plaintiff that he was going
to give the favored party the promotion in question because the favored party was "very
good in making him feel good-she's a real professional at it." Toscano, 570 F Supp. at
1201.
183. Toscano, 570F Supp. at 1199.
184. For two other examples of cases in which proof of sexual favoritism helped to
establish a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, see Dirksen v. City of Springfield, 842
F Supp. 1117, 1121-22 (C.D. 111. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claim that it was generally
necessary for women to grant sexual favors for professional advancement survives motion
to dismiss because it constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment claim); Piech v Arthur
Andersen & Co., 841 F Supp. 825, 829 (N.D. III. 1994) (holding that plaintiff s claim that
it was generally necessary for women to grant sexual favors forjob advancement constitutes
quid pro quo sexual harassment claim). In Piech, the court stated that "allegations
regarding the favored female co-worker who received a promotion while involved
romantically with a decision-maker may be considered simply circumstantial evidence that
her employer conditioned employment benefits on the granting of sexual favors." Id. at
830. While considenng the plaintiff's quid pro quo harassment claim, the Dirksen court
noted that when the plaintiff left her job on medical leave, she was replaced by a woman
who was having sexual relations with her supervisor. Dirksen, 842 F Supp. at 1121.
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show that the harassment caused her to suffer a tangible job detriment."
Thus, recovery may be difficult when, for example, the defendant can show
that the favored party's qualifications were superior to those of the
plaintiff."8
More importantly, the plaintiff must establish that the implied quid pro
quo was sufficiently general to apply to her."s One has to wonder how
often this occurs in sexual favoritism cases. Sexual favoritism typically
involves: (1) a relationship between a supervisor and his paramour and
(2) the paramour's acquisition of some job benefit through the relationship.
Such facts do not necessarily imply that other employees are subject to an
implied quid pro quo. As the EEOC observed, when a supervisor is
interested in only one woman, third-party female employees often will be
unable "to establish that sex was generally made a condition for the benefit
in question."' 8 To show that sex was generally a condition, the plaintiff
probably would need evidence that the supervisor directed his attentions
toward more than one woman. Although such evidence abounded in
Toscano, it does not typify the extant sexual favoritism litigation.8 9
C. Sexual Favoritism as Work Environment Harassment
According to the EEOC, widespread sexual favoritism also "can form
the basis of a hostile environment claim for both women and men who
find this offensive. "'° As we have seen, such claims often proceed on the
theory that the favoritism creates a sexually charged workplace atmosphere
in which employees come to feel that their job advancement depends on their
sexuality rather than their merit.' 9'
185. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting requirement of tangible job
detriment in quid pro quo sexual harassment claims).
186. The defendant in Toscano attempted to argue that the paramour's qualifications
were superior to the plaintiff's, but failed to show that the paramour's qualifications actually
did exceed those of the plaintiff. See Toscano, 570 F Supp. at 1202-03.
187 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (noting that sex must be made
general condition for receiving benefit).
188. EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6819; see supra notes 172-73.
189. For three exceptions to this generalization, see supra notes 181, 184.
190. EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 6, at 405:6820.
191. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing sexual favoritism's role
in work environment harassment claim).
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1 Broderick v Ruder
The case that the EEOC used as authority for its assertion, however,
emphasized the general offensiveness of the sexual favoritism over its ability
to reduce employees to their sexuality The plaintiff in Broderck v
Ruder1" was a female staff attorney employed in a division of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.193 She maintained that a sexually
hostile work environment existed within her division during her five years
there. 94 With only two major exceptions, the work environment harass-
ment of which the plaintiff complained was not directed at her personal-
ly 'g Instead, it mainly involved the pattern of sexual favoritism that
existed within her division. Specifically, .two female secretaries benefited
from sexual relationships with their male bosses, and a female attorney
apparently benefited from a nonsexual relationship with another male
supervisor. 9 6  Because these relationships were common knowledge
throughout the division,"9 the court held that they "created an atmosphere
of hostile work environment offensive to [the] plaintiff" and to the female
employees who also testified about them.'98 This was because the
"plaintiff was forced to work in an environment in which the [division]
managers by their conduct harassed her and other [division] female
employees, by bestowing preferential treatment upon those who submitted
to their sexual advances."' This preferential treatment, the court added,
192. 685 F Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
193. Broderick v Ruder, 685 F Supp. 1269, 1270 (D.D.C. 1988).
194. Id. None of the acts of which the plaintiff in Broderick complained involved the
exchange of employment benefits in return for her sexual favors. Id. at 1273. This
presumably is the reason why she did not make a quid pro quo harassment claim.
195. Id. at 1272-73. In one of the incidents of direct harassment, a supervisor untied
plaintiff's sweater and kissed her after getting drunk at an office party Id. at 1273. In the
other, a different supervisor repeatedly offered plaintiff a ride home during her first week at
the SEC, and after she finally acceded, he barged into her apartment and toured the premises
(including the bedroom). Id. at 1274.
196. See id. at 1274-75.
197 Id. at 1275. Division employees also frequently drank, took long lunch hours, and
went to parties together. Id.
198. Id. Later, however, the Brodenck court suggested that the instances of harassment
directed specifically at the plaintiff, see supra note 195, played a role in its decision as well.
See Broderick, 685 F Supp. at 1278.
199. Broderick, 685 F Supp. at 1278.
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also "undermined plaintiff's motivation and work performance. '"" The
court concluded:
We hold, and plaintiff has proved, that consensual sexual relations, in
exchange for tangible employment benefits, while possibly not
creating a cause of action for the recipient of such sexual advances
who does not find them unwelcome, do, and in this case did, create
and contribute to a sexually hostile working environment.201
2. Two Crticisms of Broderick v Ruder
If read as holding that sexual favoritism alone can create work
environment harassment, Broderick v Ruder is a questionable decision.
First, the case did not clearly involve gender-based discrimination against
plaintiff and the other affected employees. As we have seen, Title VII may
be violated whenever the challenged decision is motivated to any appreciable
degree by gender.' But it still is necessary for the plaintiff to have been
disadvantaged because of his or her own gender. 3  Although their
paramours' gender no doubt influenced the male supervisors' decisions in
Broderick, it is questionable how much the plaintiff's gender did so.2 4
This argument applies with even more force to the EEOC's contention that
men also can recover for work environment harassment similar to that found
in Brodenck.1 5 Although male employees no doubt could find such
behavior offensive, it hardly is motivated by their gender.
200. Id. The Broderick court then added that the preferential treatment also deprived
the plaintiff of promotions and job opportunities. Id. However, because work environment
harassment does not require a tangible job detriment, see supra note 39 and accompanying
text, and because the plaintiff apparently was not making a quid pro quo claim, see supra note
194, the relevance of this remark is not obvious.
201. Broderick, 685 F Supp. at 1280.
202. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text (discussing motivating factor
standard).
203. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
204. In this discussion, I ignore the two incidents of alleged sexual harassment directed
against the plaintiff personally See supra note 195.
205. See supra text accompanying note 190 (quoting EEOCPolicy Guide). The EEOC's
position also seems inconsistent with its earlier position on isolated instances of favoritism
resulting from consensual relationships, which depended on the claim that the victims of such
favoritism are disadvantaged for reasons other than their gender. See supra text accompany-
ing note 131 (quoting EEOC Policy Guide).
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In addition, the notion that work environment harassment can arise
solely from sexual favoritism coexists uneasily with the standards that the
Supreme Court recently has articulated for work environment sexual
harassment claims.' According to the Court, while a victim of work
environment harassment must at least perceive the environment as abu-
sive,' °7 that environment need not cause her concrete psychological
harm." s Although these two rules would not affect the result in
Brodenck, the Court also required that the employer's conduct must be
"severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive.'"I The Court further stated that in determining whether an
environment is hostile or abusive, courts should look at "all the circum-
stances," including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance. "210
Under these standards, was the sexual favoritism in the Broderick v
Ruder environment sufficiently severe or pervasive to make that environment
"objectively hostile or abusive"'?"' Certainly the favoritism occurred with
"frequency" and was "pervasive." Although the plaintiff's job environment
affected her work performance," 2 however, it is unclear whether it
"unreasonably" did so. Should a reasonable person's work performance be
affected by a pattern of sexual favoritism that did not directly impede that
work? At least as compared with some work environment harassment
cases, 213 moreover, the environment endured by the plaintiff in Broderick
206. See Harris v Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993); see also supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing Hams).
207 Hams, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.
208. Id. at 371.
209. Id. at 370.
210. Id. at 371.
211. Again, I ignore the two instances of possible work environment that were directed
at the plaintiff herself. See supra note 195.
212. See Broderick, 685 F Supp. at 1278; see also supra note 200 and accompanying
text (discussing effect of preferential treatment in Broderick).
213. For some allegations of particularly egregious work environment harassment, see
Mentor Say Bank v Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (supervisor allegedly fondled plaintiff
during working hours, exposed himself to her, entered women's restroom when plaintiff was
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hardly seems "severe." And only the most delicate would regard her
environment as "physically threatening or humiliating."
214
3. Other Sexual Favontism/Work Environment
Harassment Cases
Even if Broderick v Ruder was correctly decided, subsequent cases
suggest little judicial inclination to broaden sexual favoritism/work
environment harassment claims beyond the facts of that case. Courts seem
particularly reluctant to allow recovery when, unlike Broderick, one
supervisor was having a relationship with one subordinate. For example, in
Dnnkwater v Union Carbide Corp. ,2i5 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit confronted a claim based mainly on a sexual relation-
ship between the plaintiff's supervisor and the plaintiff's female subordi-
nate.216 Even though the supervisor favored his paramour and may have
disadvantaged the plaintiff,27 the court read the plaintiff's claim as one
alleging hostile environment sexual harassment." 8 While denying that
in there alone, and raped her on several occasions); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (construction workers on construction site repeatedly asked female "flag
persons" for sexual intercourse and oral sex, frequently mooned them, occasionally engaged
in offensive touchings of their thighs and breasts, called them abusive sex-related names,
secretly observed them while they were urinating, and caused one woman's car to
malfunction by urinating into its gas tank).
214. Although the point is not directly relevant to the "reasonableness" inquiry, the
Broderick court concluded that the "plaintiff was a sensitive person who had adjustment
problems before she came to the SEC" and that "the environment in which she worked
exacerbated these problems." Broderick, 685 F Supp. at 1273; see td. at 1280. Indeed,
there was testimony that she suffered from "a paranoid personality disorder," and the court
did not explicitly reject this testimony Id. at 1273.
215. 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying New Jersey law).
216. Drinkwater v Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1990).
217 See id. at 854-57
218. Id. at 859. The Drnkwater court conceded that the plaintiff might have been
making a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, but asserted that she had offered no evidence
to support that claim. Id. at 859 n.9. The court also asserted that if the supervisor was
illegally using sexual attractiveness as a performance criterion, the plaintiff "must give the
court some basis on which to so find." Id. A normal sexual favoritism claim was precluded
because the case was decided under New Jersey law, and the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in Erickson v Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990), blocked such
a claim. See Drnkwater, 904 F.2d at 861.
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claim, the Third Circuit distinguished Brodenck because sexual conduct
pervaded the work environment in Broderick."9 By contrast, the Dnnk-
water court found that "there is no evidence that [the supervisor and his
paramour] flaunted the romantic nature of their relationship, nor is there
evidence that these kinds of relationships were prevalent."I However,
a sexually charged environment could be discriminatory "if sexual discourse
displaced standard business procedure in a way that prevented plaintiff from
working in an environment in which she could be evaluated on grounds other
than her sexuality "a Finally, the court also discounted two alleged
sexually stereotypical remarks by the supervisor because "[h]ostile
environment claims must demonstrate a continuous period of harassment,
and two comments do not create an atmosphere."' m In the process, the
court implicitly affirmed the uncontroversial proposition that other sex-
related behavior may contribute to a work environment claim involving
sexual favoritism, and vice versa.m
4. Conclusions
All things considered, the prospects for attacking sexual favoritism as
work environment sexual harassment look dim. For one thing, it is
questionable how often sexual favoritism will be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create an objectively hostile work environment. Still, cases in
which the favoritism is even more open and pervasive than in Brodenck v
219. See Drnkwater, 904 F.2d at 862 & n.16; see also Candelore v Clark County
Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where coworker allegedly
was having romantic affair with one or more of plaintiff's supervisors, plaintiff's allegation
that coworker's sexually charged behavior created hostile work environment failed because
coworker's involvement with supervisor was insufficient for liability by itself, affairs in
question largely took place outside work hours and work environment, and alleged incidents
of sexual horseplay took place over series of years); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679
F Supp. 495, 501-02 (W.D. Pa.) (rejecting weak work environment harassment claim in
which sexual favoritism played some role, but apparently recognizing that sexual favoritism
can contribute to work environment harassment claim), aff'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.
1988).
220. Drnnkwater, 904 F.2d at 862.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 862-63.
223. See Miller, 679 F Supp. at 501-02 (recognizing possibility that sexual favoritism
was one component of pattern of alleged work environment harassment, yet rejecting claim).
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Ruder are imaginable and would seem to be candidates for the imposition of
liability In addition, sexual favoritism can contribute to a work environ-
ment claim in which other forms of harassment are present. The real
problem with sexual favoritism-based work environment harassment claims,
however, is whether they involve discrimination based on the victim's
gender. 4  Both men and women apparently can mount such claims.'
More importantly, the victim's gender probably is not the motive for the
favoritism that he or she attacks.
V Conclusion
Title VII's new section 703(m), which forbids employment practices
in which sex was a "motivating factor,"' may someday expand the
statute's reach. Currently, Title VII does not bar discrimination on the bases
of sexual orientation, transsexualism, and physical appearance. 7 But like
sexual favoritism,' discrimination on these grounds often is bound up
with gender. Whatever section 703(m)'s eventual impact in these areas,
however, it does not touch sexual favoritism. The reason, as always, is Title
VII's section 703(a), which forbids employment discrimination against an
individual only when that discrimination is "because of such individual's
sex."2 9 Because practitioners of sexual favoritism are not motivated by
224. However, the problem of whether gender-based discrimination exists should not
often arise in cases in which sexual favoritism helps establish implied quid pro quo
harassment. In those situations, the favoritism is used merely to assist in proving harassment
that normally is itself discriminatory
225. See supra text accompanying note 190 (quoting EEOC Policy Guide).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. III 1991); see supra notes 101-10 and accompany-
ing text (discussing motivating factor standard).
227 See PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.25(c)(2) (noting inapplicability of Title VII to claims
of discrimination based on homosexuality and transsexuality). See generally Note, supra note
122 (using handicap discrimination law, and not Title VII, as preferred device for outlawing
discrimination on basis of physical appearance, thereby implying that Title VII does not even
arguably bar such discrimination).
228. See supra notes 91-92, 108-10 and accompanying text (discussing gender's role in
sexual favoritism claims).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (emphasis added); see id. § 2000e-2(b)-(d).
Because § 703(m) begins with the words "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter,"
id. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. 111 1991), § 703(m) should not override § 703(a). However, a
similar "motivations" test probably now applies under § 703(a). See supra notes 111-14 and
accompanying text (discussing relationship between § 703(a) and § 703(m)).
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their victims' gender, that favoritism is not "because of" their sex under
section 703(a).3  By contrast, discrimination against homosexuals,
transsexuals, and the physically unattractive often cannot readily be
separated from their gender.
However, victims of sexual favoritism may sometimes have recourse
to Title VII sexual harassment law When the favored party submits to quid
pro quo harassment, the victim of the resulting favoritism should have
standing to sue for the harassment." Few, if any, cases have involved
this fact pattern, however. 2 When the employer has implicitly made
sexual submission a condition for obtaining job benefits or avoiding job
detriments, moreover, sexual favoritism sometimes may help establish that
implied condition. 3  Cases of this kind, though, have not been abundant
to date. 4  Finally, sexual favoritism may occasionally be so pronounced
and pervasive as to become, or contribute to, work environment sexual
harassment." In all likelihood, however, most forms of sexual favoritism
will lack the necessary severity and pervasiveness. In addition, it is
questionable whether this workplace misbehavior has anything to do with the
victim's gender.
In sum, Title VII has relatively little to offer victims of sexual
favoritism. Although this conclusion most likely leaves those people without
a legal remedy, several considerations may help mitigate the injustice. First,
it is difficult to believe that sexual favoritism was before Congress's mind
when it included sex among Title VII's forbidden grounds for employer
decisions. 6  Second, although sexual favoritism obviously involves
gender, when considered as a whole it seems to resemble nepotism v more
230. For some possible qualifications to this statement, see supra note 113.
231. See generally supra notes 131-70 and accompanying text (discussing standing
issue).
232. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that no sexual favoritism case
exists in which coerced sexual relationship was involved).
233. See generally supra notes 171-89 and accompanying text (discussing sexual
favoritism's relationship to implied quid pro quo sexual harassment claims).
234. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text (finding only three such decisions).
235. See generally supra notes 190-225 and accompanying text (discussing sexual
favoritism's relationship to work environment sexual harassment claims).
236. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's legislative
history).
237 See Ayers v AT&T, 826 F Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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than, for example, misogyny, stereotyped views about female abilities, or
the belief that women belong in the home. Finally, Title VII never was
intended to rectify every employment-related injustice or to establish the
Perfectly Meritocratic Workplace. Instead, Title VII simply forbids
employment discrimination on the bases of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. And as we have seen, 218 there are many moral reasons for
distinguishing sexual favoritism from these abuses.
238. See supra notes 115-30 and accompanying text (arguing that sexual favoritism is
morally less objectionable that discrimination forbidden by Title VII).

